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Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on victims of mass atrocities, subjects who are often 
portrayed in international law discourses as disempowered, passive, defenceless 
and docile. This portrayal prevents international law operators from evaluating the 
potential of domestic practices that are not only agentic, but may contribute to the 
development of international law. In focusing on victims of mass atrocities more-
over, this thesis connects international law with domestic practices of victims of 
mass atrocities that resort to the category of ‘victim’ as well as other categories 
from international law in their struggles. The main contention of the dissertation 
is that domestic practices of those who use the language of international law, such 
as victims of mass atrocities, do not merely adopt such language as it is. Instead, 
they infuse this language with meanings that support their particular struggles and, 
through their actions, they also influence the formation of an identity associated 
with the category of victim.  
The dissertation consists of four articles and a summarising report. It has two 
main focal points: first, it focuses on the practices of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) with regard to victims of mass atrocities; second, it focuses on cases 
of victims of mass atrocities that resort to the category of victim and other cate-
gories from international law, in Colombia. By contrasting these two, I suggest 
that there are varied and rich contributions through which victims of mass atroc-
ities themselves can influence not only the shaping of legal categories, but more 
importantly, their own representations and identity. 
In Article I, I refer to the work of Jacques Rancière on politics, to reflect on 
victims of mass atrocity and their participation in the International Criminal Court. 
In practice, despite including a framework for victims’ participation, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court does not really provide victims with any spaces for self-
representation. The reason is that this framework is based on an understanding of 
these victims as essentially disempowered individuals that must, therefore, be rep-
resented by others. This exclusion, I conclude, perpetuates the limited depiction 
of victimhood.  
Article II deals with the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó and its use 
of the category of victim. I show the group has a complex identity that challenges 
the representations of victims as defenceless and disempowered. I suggest that the 
group does not simply embrace international law, but attempts to develop it fur-
ther in creative ways. Article III deals with the Movement of Victims of State 
iv 
 
Crimes (MOVICE). I show that through the category of victim, Movice attempts 
to introduce an alternative narrative of the internal armed conflict. I suggest that 
Movice is an example of how a movement of victims can adopt categories of in-
ternational law to frame their struggles, and in doing so, infuse them with new 
meanings.  While still focusing on Colombia, Article IV zooms out to include ac-
tions that are considered as agentic, as well as those that support the stereotype of 
the passive and defenceless victim. I suggest that the different actions of both 
victims and the government contribute to the formation of an identity of the vic-
tim, an identity that is never fully realised but always in dispute.   
Finally, in the summarising report, I reflect upon how the method of this dis-
sertation combines a critical approach to law with an approach from below that con-
siders domestic practices as relevant for international law. Moreover, I discuss 
three concepts that represent three different perspectives from which I consider 
the victims of mass atrocities, namely as political subjects, as subalterns, and as a 
disputed identity. I conclude by reflecting on the possibility of emancipation 
through the struggles that utilise the language of the law. 
 
?  
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Abstrakti 
Tämä väitöskirja käsittelee vakavien kansainvälisten rikosten uhreja. Kansainväli-
sen oikeuden diskursseissa uhrit esitetään usein voimattomina, passiivisina, puo-
lustuskyvyttöminä ja alistuvina. Uhrien esittäminen tällä tavalla estää kansainväli-
sen oikeuden toimijoita arvioimasta potentiaalia sellaisissa kansallisissa käytän-
nöissä, jotka korostavat toimijuutta ja voivat osallistua kansainvälisen oikeuden 
kehittämiseen. Keskittymällä kansainvälisten rikosten uhreihin väitöskirja yhdistää 
kansainvälisen oikeuden kansallisiin käytäntöihin, joissa uhrit käyttävät ’uhrin’ ka-
tegoriaa ja muita kansainvälisen oikeuden kategorioita. Esitän, että kansainvälisen 
oikeuden kieltä käyttävät uhrit eivät ainoastaan omaksu kansainvälisen oikeuden 
kieltä sellaisenaan. Sen sijaan uhrit kyllästävät kansainvälisen oikeuden kielen mer-
kityksillä, jotka tukevat heidän kamppailujaan. Uhrit myös vaikuttavat oman toi-
mintansa kautta kansainvälisen oikeuden uhri-kategoriaan liittyvän identiteetin 
muodostumiseen. 
 
Väitöskirja koostuu neljästä artikkelista ja tiivistelmästä. Väitöskirja keskittyy 
kahteen kontekstiin. Ensinnäkin väitöskirja keskittyy kansainvälisen rikostuomio-
istuimen kansainvälisten rikosten uhreihin liittyviin käytäntöihin ja oikeuskäytän-
töön (Artikkeli I). Toiseksi väitöskirja käsittelee Kolumbiaan sijoittuvia esimerk-
kejä, joissa kansainvälisten rikosten uhrit hyödyntävät uhri-kategoriaa ja muita kan-
sainvälisen oikeuden kategorioita (Artikkelit II, III ja IV). Rinnastamalla nämä 
kaksi kontekstia esitän, että kansainvälisten rikosten uhreilla on useita ja rikkaita 
tapoja vaikuttaa omaan identiteettiinsä, oikeudellisten kategorioiden muodostumi-
seen sekä siihen, miten uhrit esitetään kansainvälisessä oikeudessa sekä kansalli-
sissa yhteyksissä. Väitöskirjan yhteenvedossa käsittelen lisäksi väitöskirjan meto-
dia. Metodi yhdistää kriittisen lähestymistavan oikeuteen sekä ’alhaalta ylös’-lähes-
tymistavan (approach from below), joka pitää kansallisia käytäntöjä relevantteina 
kansainväliselle oikeudelle. Käsittelen kansainvälisten rikosten uhreja kolmesta eri 
näkökulmasta käyttäen apuna poliittisten subjektien, alistettujen (subalterns) ja 
kiistellyn identiteetin käsitteitä. Lopuksi pohdin emansipaation mahdollisuutta 
oikeuden kieltä käyttävien kamppailujen kautta. ?  
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Preface 
In 2012, I had the chance to intern for Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito at the Inter-
national Criminal Court, in The Hague. She was one of the three judges of Trial 
Chamber I, responsible for the first case to be taken to trial, the case of The Prose-
cutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. I arrived at a special moment: As the first verdict 
had already been rendered declaring Mr. Lubanga guilty, the first decision estab-
lishing principles and procedures for reparations to victims was about to be deliv-
ered. Although my contributions as an unpaid intern were, of course, only mar-
ginal, I was thrilled to feel part of this landmark decision. One of the novelties of 
the ICC was precisely the possibility for victims of mass atrocities to participate in 
the proceedings and to seek reparations against the convicted person. The com-
mon word when talking about this feature was that, at the ICC, victims were, for 
the first time, central to the international criminal system, thus overcoming the 
limitations of previous international criminal tribunals. Unlike the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the ICC had granted victims rights that were 
absent from those other tribunals. Because of this, the decision felt not only as a 
landmark for international justice, but also, as a symbolic landmark for the victims, 
namely children that had been abducted and forced to take arms and commit ter-
rible atrocities.1 
As the former prosecutor stated, at least a couple of times: ‘My mandate is 
justice, justice for the victims.’2 This sentiment, namely the idea the ICC was an 
institution working to deliver justice for victims of mass atrocities when this could 
not be done domestically, seemed to drive a lot of the work that was done at the 
ICC. Certainly, it was inspiring to see so many bright professionals from different 
                                               
1 In 2012, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was found guilty of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years 
and using them to participate actively in hostilities and was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment. See: 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga  
2  This particular phrase was used at least a couple of times, see: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=press%20release%20media%20advisory_%20icc%20prosecutor%20vis-
its%20egypt%20and%20saudi%20arabia  and http://www.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/events/ICC.aspx 
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corners of the world working guided by the idea that the ICC was an institution 
working to fight impunity and bring justice to affected communities. Judge Odio 
Benito herself, was profoundly committed to that idea, and I found her commit-
ment truthful and inspiring.  
However, after having worked at the Court for a few weeks, I was told that a 
victim was coming to testify before the Court and encouraged to take the morning 
off and attend the hearings where the victim would testify as it would allow me to 
better comprehend the complexities of the work of the Court.  
A victim. One Victim.  
There was a certain dissonance between what I was working on — the draft 
text of the first decision establishing principles on reparations for victims, based 
on the idea that victims of the crimes were central to the ICC —and the fact that 
having one victim at the court seemed to be a rare event that I should not miss. It 
was not until later though, during my doctoral studies, that I was able to articulate 
that dissonance. It was disappointing to see that, in an institution whose work is 
often legitimised by the claim that justice is being brought to victims, the presence 
of a single victim was exceptional enough so that, in a six—month period, this 
would occur only a few times. As I articulated this idea, I realised I had found the 
core problem that would inspire my doctoral research.  
Thus, the dissonance between the importance attributed to victims of mass 
atrocity and the absence of actual victims in the context of the ICC became the 
starting point of this thesis.   
 1 
1. Introduction 
This thesis seeks to contrast the way victims of mass atrocities are usually represented 
as essentially disempowered in international law institutions, and more specifically, in 
the international criminal court, with the actions of these victims that use the language 
of international law and the category of victim domestically. I use the term ‘mass 
atrocity’ as circumscribed to crimes affecting large amounts of individuals, and more 
particularly, international core crimes recognised by the statutes of the main interna-
tional criminal courts, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.3 The 
suffering experienced by the victims of these crimes has a compelling force. It inspires 
empathy towards the persons who endure it, which motivates others to do something 
to alleviate that suffering. This force has lately become an essential pole in contempo-
rary politics: It is present in its discourses and is a constant source of legitimisation for 
its practices.4 Similarly, this force has prompted several scholarly works that deal with 
victims of mass atrocities from different perspectives, often inspired by a profound 
and truthful interest in the suffering of many individuals around the world. This force, 
also inspired me to write this thesis.  
The different areas of law dealing with victims of mass atrocities 
Though mass atrocities and its victims have existed for a long time in our history, 
it was only recently that a variety of judicial and quasi-judicial responses have been 
specially developed with the aims of achieving societal reconciliation and addressing 
victims’ needs. Furthermore, victims’ needs have been identified in the law and con-
cretise in the concepts of truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-repetition. 
The variety of responses that have been devised in the aftermath of mass atrocities 
include international tribunals — such as, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC — but 
also other non-judicial responses like truth commissions, administrative reparation 
                                               
3 See: UN Security Council, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (September 2009), 
Articles 1-5; UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as last amended on 13 October 2006), 
(November 1994), Articles 1-4; UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (January 2002), Articles 2-
4; UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), (July 1998), Articles 5-8. 
4 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason (University of California Press, 2012), 1. 
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programs, lustration measures, and symbolic measures, such as, official apologies, the 
construction of memorials, among others. Thus, when thinking of victims of mass 
atrocities from a legal perspective, different legal frameworks, fields and sub-fields 
should be considered.5 In particular, the most relevant areas of international law are 
international human rights law, international criminal law, and the practice of transi-
tional justice that deals with these two areas but is, at the same time, acquiring a certain 
distinctive scope, mixing domestic and international features. Let me briefly develop 
some ideas in order to sketch the relations between these areas of practice and aca-
demic thought. 
International human rights law is often described as having emerged in the after-
math of World War II with the Nuremberg trials and the passing of the charter of the 
United Nations.6 As an area of public international law, it is said to be distinctive in 
that — breaking with the tradition of states being the subjects of international law — 
it gives individual persons the possibility to appear before international law institutions 
through the right of petition.7 This possibility is granted to the individual person when 
she suffers from a violation of one of the basic rights that are acknowledged by this 
area of law to all individual persons by virtue of being human.8 Moreover, while all 
human rights are thought to protect the most basic liberties of individuals, only some 
                                               
5 The word ‘field’ in this thesis should only be loosely related with Bourdieu’s conception of field as an area of structured, 
socially patterned activity or “practice”, disciplinarily and professionally defined. Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Intro-
duction to ‘The Force of Law: Toward a sociology of the juridical field’ (1986-1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805. Specif-
ically, I am not convinced that transitional justice can be considered as field. For a discussion on the contested quality 
of transitional justice as a field or discipline see: Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of 
the “Field” or “Non-Field”’ (2009) 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice 5 and Catherine Turner, Violence, Law and 
the Impossibility of Transitional Justice (Routledge, 2017), 13-45. In turn, international criminal law has been described as a 
field riddled by an anxiety that affects its own definition, its professional practice, and its institutions. Frédéric Mégret, 
‘The anxieties of International Criminal Justice’ (2016) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 197. 
6 See for instance: Henry Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context (3rd edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 133. The charter’s preamble stated that it would set the basis for a system of international 
law that would ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights (and) in the dignity and worth of the human person.’ United 
Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, preamble. Recent accounts have contended that 
the role of human rights in the charter of the UN was actually extremely limited and that the actual development of 
human rights as a discourse took place later, during the seventies and eighties, and not in its early formulation. See: 
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap Press, 2012). 
7 Cf. Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
8 Discussing human rights, Hannah Arendt shows that the idea of rights being granted only because of one’s humanity, 
clashes with the need to belong to a community that would be able to enforce these rights. Thus, the problem is not if 
a person has rights or not, but that the person belongs to a community that would enforce them. Hannah Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, 1973), 290 -302. 
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of these violations can be considered as mass atrocities. Finally, international human 
rights law is traditionally considered as a limitation to state power.9 According to this 
idea, when a breach is asserted, it is the state that is internationally responsible for it 
and must cease the violation, repair, and guarantee its non-repetition.  
In turn, international criminal law is ‘a body of international rules designed to both 
proscribe certain categories of conduct (…) and to make those persons who engage 
in such conduct criminally liable.’10 Moreover, according to Fisher, an international 
crime is distinguishable from other crimes in that it is an extremely severe violation 
whose perpetration involves a certain degree of political organisation.11 Just as in in-
ternational human rights law, the aftermath of World War II and the Nuremberg trials 
are often cited as the seminal events that gave rise to the current system of interna-
tional criminal law. However, it was only in 2002, that the first permanent institution 
applying international criminal law began its work, namely the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).12 While a breach to international human rights norms can give rise to 
international responsibility of the state, breaches to international criminal norms entail 
individual criminal responsibility. Moreover, the Statute of the ICC included not only 
the idea of individual criminal prosecution under international norms, but also, the 
possibility of victims of the crimes to participate and seek for reparations. Especially 
with regard to victims, and victims’ reparations, the practice of international human 
rights courts has significantly influenced the ICC.13 
                                               
9 Henry Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context (3rd edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 1385: ‘The centrality of the state is one of the defining features of international law and the human rights 
system build upon this by seeking to bind states through a network of treaty obligations to which, in the vast majority 
of cases, only states can become parties.’ 
10 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2008), 1. 
11 She groups these two characteristics in two thresholds, namely, a severity threshold, according to which, it must rep-
resent a severe violation to the most urgent human rights, that is, physical security rights; and an associative threshold 
that refers to the way in which this right is violated, as it involves political organisation. Kirsten Fisher, Moral Accountability 
and International Criminal Law (Routledge, 2012), 9-25. 
12 Prior to this, two ad hoc tribunals had been created, namely the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia, established in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established in 1994. It should be noted 
that, unlike those two predecessors, the work of the ICC follows a principle of complementarity according to which, the 
court only acts if the states fail to prosecute. Cassese, supra note 10, 342-344. 
13 Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court (Routledge, New York, 2014) 4, 41 et seq and 158-
159. Moreover, the very idea of including measures for victims in the context of the international criminal procedure 
has been seen as the result of the influence of restorative justice ideas together with human rights law and transitional 
 4 
Finally, transitional justice is ‘the conception of justice associated with periods of 
political change, characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of re-
pressive predecessor regimes.’14 Wrongdoings in transitional justice are often con-
nected to the notion of mass atrocities.15 Though its origins are also often traced back 
to the aftermath of World War II, the term was coined only in 2000.16 Furthermore, 
for Uprimny and Saffón, the notion of transitional justice is fairly recent as it refers to 
a particular way of responding to past atrocities that balances between full retributive 
justice, on the one side, and absolute impunity, on the other.17 In order to meet this 
requirement, different — retributive and restorative — mechanisms, such as, individ-
ual criminal prosecution, administrative reparations, truth-seeking initiatives, institu-
tional reform, and others, have been developed.18 Moreover, transitional justice stands 
somewhere in between the domestic and the international, as it entails ‘differing levels 
of international involvement (or none at all).’19 At the normative level, however, both 
soft-law documents drafted in international institutions as well as decisions of inter-
national courts are often considered guiding principles in transitional justice pro-
cesses.20 
                                               
justice. See also: Brianne McGonigle, Procedural Justice?: Victim participation in international criminal proceedings (Intersentia, 
Cambridge, 2011). 
14 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69, at 69. Another often cited 
definition describes transitional justice as: ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s at-
tempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation.’ UN Security Council, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: report of the 
Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616, para. 8. 
15 However, its scope is in constant expansion and today there are discussions related to the inclusion of violations to 
human rights that do not necessarily amount to mass atrocities as described here, such as, violations to economic, social 
and rights. This discussion is based in the idea that transitional justice mechanisms should take into account the root 
causes of conflict and repressive rule, among these, historically constructed socioeconomic inequalities, that is, violations 
to economic, social and cultural rights. See: Lars Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past:Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic 
Wrongs’ (2012) 21 Social & Legal Studies 171 and OHCHR, Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
HR/PUB/13/5 (2014). 
16 Teitel, supra note 14; Teitel is credited with coining the term in: Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
17 Rodrigo Uprimny and Maria Paula Saffón, ‘Justicia Transicional y Justicia Restaurativa: Tensiones y Complemen-
tariedades’ en Angelika Rettberg (ed), Entre el Perdón y el Paredón: Preguntas y dilemas de la justicia transicional (Ediciones 
Uniandes, 2005).  
18 UN Security Council, supra note 14 at para. 8. 
19 Id.  
20 E.g. UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Viola-
tions of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law : resolution / adopted by the General 
Assembly, 21 March 2006, A/RES/60/147; UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert to update the 
Set of Principles to combat impunity, 18 February 2005, E/CN.4/2005/102; UN Security Council, supra note 14. Also, in 
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Thus, these three areas — international human rights law, international criminal 
law, and transitional justice — overlap in that they all represent different responses to 
mass atrocities. A breach of international law can give rise to both international re-
sponsibility of the state (under international human rights norms) and international 
criminal responsibility of an individual (for instance, in the case of heads of state). 
Also, transitional justice measures in response to that breach can arise both from a 
domestic political decision and from a decision of international human rights courts 
and can co-exist with a decision finding individual criminal responsibility from an in-
ternational criminal court. In Colombia, for instance, the involvement of the ICC in 
overseeing of the situation and evaluating the possibility of initiating criminal prose-
cution has influenced the way that transitional justice measures are considered domes-
tically by the state.21 In addition, there are decisions of the Inter American Court of 
Human Rights that find the Colombian state responsible for violations to human 
rights committed by illegal armed groups.22 
Moreover, these three areas pay attention to the situation of the victims of mass 
atrocities. This is reflected especially in the different measures of redress that can be 
awarded in their benefit. In this sense, for instance, after establishing state responsi-
bility under international human rights norms, a decision by a regional court such as 
the Inter American Court of Human Rights or the European Court of Human Rights 
can also award victims different remedies.23 Similarly, in the context of the ICC, the 
                                               
2011, the Human Rights Council decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation 
and guarantees of non-recurrence. The Special Rapporteur’s mission is to deal with situations in which there have been 
gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law. See: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/Index.aspx (last accessed: 19 October 2018). 
21 Jennifer Easterday, ‘Beyond the “shadow” of the ICC’ in C. De Vos, S. Kendall, & C. Stahn (eds.) Contested Justice: The 
Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
22 IACtHR, Case 19 Merchants v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection. Judgment of June 12, 2002. Series C No. 93; Case 
of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 
140; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148; Case of the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163. 
23 It should be noted, however, that the practice of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter American Court 
of Human Rights vary with regards to the different remedies awarded to victims. In this regard, the practice of the Inter 
American Court is said to be more progressive, having developed a rich jurisprudence with regards to reparations to 
victims. See for instance: Douglas Cassel, 'The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by the Inter-
American Court’ (2016) 7 Revista do Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos 91; Thomas M. Antkowiak, ‘An Emerging 
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Rome Statute has explicitly included the possibility to award reparations to victims.24 
Thus, after establishing individual responsibility, the court can decide to order repara-
tions against the convicted person. Finally, in the context of transitional justice, many 
of the different measures that have been developed to address past violence are par-
ticularly aimed at redressing victims. These measures include administrative repara-
tions programs aimed at providing reparations to large numbers of victims, as well as, 
symbolic measures, like official apologies or the construction of memorials. 
The research questions and contributions of this thesis 
The research questions that guided this research have been refined at various 
stages of the research process. In its final version, the thesis first asks whether the 
international criminal court recognises victims as subjects with agency when it pro-
vides spaces for victims’ participation. It further asks how the domestic practices of 
victims who invoke the category of victim from international law take shape, what 
their effects are, and how they can potentially contribute to international law. 
The main contention of this dissertation is that domestic practices of subjects 
such as victims of mass atrocities that use the language of international law, do not 
limit themselves to adopting it passively; instead, they infuse this language with mean-
ings that align with their struggles and, with their actions, they also influence the for-
mation of an identity associated with the category of victim. These influences are es-
pecially relevant for a subject who is often portrayed as disempowered, passive, de-
fenceless and docile, thus preventing international law operators from evaluating the 
potential of domestic practices that are not only agentic, but may, at times, contribute 
to the development of international law. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature that focuses on victims of mass 
atrocities first in its approach that connects the practice of an international institution 
                                               
Mandate for International Courts: Victim-centered Remedies and Restorative Justice’ (2011) 47 Stanford Journal of Inter-
national Law 279. 
24 The Rome Statute established this possibility for the first time in international criminal law. This possibility is contained 
in Article 75 of the Rome Statute. 
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such as the international criminal court and its framework for victims’ participation 
and contrasts it with the actions of victims of mass atrocities that wield at the domestic 
level the category of victim and its associated legal frameworks. This dissertation fur-
ther contributes to the literature by studying the ways in which the category develops 
at the grassroots level and reflecting on how these practices are relevant for interna-
tional law.  
Defining an approach 
Throughout my doctoral studies, I rehearsed different ways of looking at the topic 
of victims of mass atrocities. At the beginning of my studies, the focus of my research 
was on discerning the specific realm of international criminal law so as to determine 
the place of the victim in this context. The creation of the ICC with its framework for 
victims’ participation and reparation, departed from the earlier exclusive focus on in-
dividual criminal responsibility of the embryonic international criminal law. Indeed, 
until the creation of the ICC, victims of mass atrocities had not taken part of interna-
tional criminal courts but as witnesses and, because of this, their inclusion as more 
than that brought all sorts of tensions and ambiguities. My aim was to find coherence 
between the different areas of international law that deal with victims of mass atroci-
ties. The assumption here was that each of the areas dealing with victims of mass 
atrocities had its own specific realm that could be defined or deciphered like a frontier 
separating one territory from the other. My aim, then, was to decipher the specificity 
of international criminal law and its connection with its framework of victims’ partic-
ipation and reparations vis-à-vis other areas dealing with these victims. 
Yet, such a doctrinal approach was eventually influenced by the critical legal ap-
proach to international law practised as the University of Helsinki.25 I became increas-
ingly disappointed with the lack of presence of actual victims, and victims’ actions in 
                                               
25 Andrea Bianchi has described the ‘Helsinki School’ entirely around the figure of Martti Koskenniemi. Indeed, his work 
is influential not only in Helsinki but in other parts of the world. Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories (Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 163 et seq. However, when thinking about the critical legal approach of the University of Hel-
sinki, I am thinking of the influence that my work received from different scholars that — based permanently or tem-
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the context of international criminal justice mechanisms.26 I began to observe how 
victims’ assumed interest in justice was often used to legitimise the actions of different 
organs of the ICC.27 In this context, I came saw that victims’ central place in the con-
text of the ICC does not translate in victims’ presence at the Court, but instead, in 
different legal rights coupled with the practice of often being invoked by different 
actors within the Court. Invoking victims grants legitimacy to the work of the Court 
as the moral strength of their suffering is the stated reason justifying the work of dif-
ferent organs at the Court.28 However, there are very few opportunities in which actual 
victims can present themselves at the Court, both before the judges and in discussions 
where administrative and strategic decisions are made. In the absence of victims, the 
discourse of others, speaking in their behalf, builds a certain identity of the victim of 
mass atrocity where these appear as subjects defined mainly by a suffering that seem-
ingly renders them unable to act on their own behalf. Others are then called — and 
legitimised — to act for them and on their behalf. 
Thus, coherence stopped being a goal. Instead, I became convinced that it was 
crucial to see that there were both political motivations and effects at play in the dif-
ferent areas dealing with victims’ of mass atrocities. In this light, the law regarding 
victims of mass atrocities, despite its seemingly harmless motivations, could also be 
understood as ‘a mechanism for creating and legitimating configurations of economic 
                                               
porarily in Helsinki — have influenced my way of thinking in their writings, or in conversations, or in academic discus-
sions. I probably cannot make a list without leaving someone behind as, indeed, this was the result of a gradual process 
where the influence was felt more as a slow, but strong, current that I eventually went along with. I will develop further 
how this thesis has a critical approach in the section on method. 
26 This may be an effect of what Bourdieu has called, the ‘institution of a monopoly’ where the ‘judicial space’ entails the 
establishment of a line that separates those who are qualified to act in it from non-specialists. Non-specialists’ sense of 
fairness, in the judicial context, is disqualified. In this context, the inclusion of victims as participants in an international 
criminal court finds a qualified limitation in the fact that the ‘juridical field is a social space organized around the con-
version of direct conflict between directly concerned parties into juridically regulated debate between professionals acting 
by proxy.’ Victims, as lay actors, find their participation always mediated by the legal professionals. Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The 
Force of Law: Toward a sociology of the juridical field’ (1986-1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805, 828-831. In my view, 
the decision to include victims as participants in a judicial procedures such as the ICC’s should seriously consider to 
bridge this invisible gap, thus opening a way for lay actors to have a significant participation.  
27 In this, two works were particularly thought-provoking: Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen, ‘Representational Practices 
at the International Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood’ (2014) 76 Law and Contempo-
rary Problems 235; and Laurel Fletcher, ‘Refracted Justice: The imagined victim and the International Criminal Court’ in 
C. De Vos et al (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2015). 
28 Ibid. 
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and political power.’29 Similarly, the way in which victims are represented by others, 
as defenceless, passive, and docile, has different effects, on the one hand it justifies 
the intervention of others. On the other, it is problematic both for victims who do 
comply with the stereotype and for those who do not. The latter may struggle for to 
be recognised as actual victims, while the former’s recognition is dependent on an 
understanding of victims as lacking agency.30 Therefore, the law had to be seen in its 
interaction with these political motivations and effects both enabling and limiting its 
achievement.31  
But the approach of this thesis is also, and perhaps more crucially, defined by an 
interest in connecting international law with local practices of victims of mass atroci-
ties themselves. My interest was to show that the inclusion of the category of victim 
in the context of the ICC cannot have the effect of acknowledging victims’ agency as 
an actor in the process if victims remain absent from it. At the same time, I could not 
fully accept the idea that the main effect of this discourse has been and still is the 
disempowerment of the individual person.32 Instead, I believed that, together with that 
effect, at the local level, the discourse of human rights could result in the empower-
ment of individuals and groups of victims as it allows them to articulate claims in a 
common language that provides legitimacy.33  
                                               
29 Joseph William Singer, ‘The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’ (1984) 94 The Yale Law Journal 1, 6. 
30 Christine Schwöbel-Patel, ‘Spectacle in International Criminal Law: The fundraising image of victimhood’ (2016) 4 
London Review of International Law 247, 250. 
31 Indeed, the idea that ‘law is politics’ is one of the main and most popular propositions of the critical legal studies 
movement (CLS) that began in the seventies in the United States. This idea is meant to counter the traditional position 
that understands the law as removed from the political, thus neutral and objective. See: Bianchi, supra note 25 at 135 et 
seq.  
32 Some of these critiques can be found in: René Urueña, No Citizens Here: Global Subjects and Participation in International 
Law (Brill, 2012), at 93; Richard Wilson, ‘Representing Human Rights Violations: Social Contexts and Subjectivities’ in 
M. Goodale (ed.), Human Rights: An Anthropological Reader (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), at 215; applying these ideas to the 
context of the ICC: Adam Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford University 
Press, 2011), at 182; Makau Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’(2001) 42 Harvard 
International Law Journal 201. 
33 I should note here that there is a variety of critiques and that some of them also acknowledge this point. This is 
precisely the point that Koskenniemi makes in an piece in which he asks ‘what is international law for?,’ the answer to 
this question reveals the indeterminate character of international law as it serves, at the same time, ‘to advance the 
repertory of substantive values, preferences and practices that those in dominant positions seek to realize in the world’ 
and to ‘give voice to those who have been excluded from decision-making positions and are regularly treated as objects 
of other peoples’ policies’ by providing a platform through which ‘claims about violence, injustice, and social deprivation 
may be made even against the dominant elements.’  Martti Koskkeniemi, ‘What is International Law For?’ in Malcom 
D. Evans (ed) International Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 110. 
 10 
In order to examine these two effects, I had to connect the international with the 
local. My assumption was that true agentic behaviour by victims of mass atrocity that 
resort to the language of international law could be found there. As I will show below, 
this is an unusual connection: I focus on the institutional sphere at the international 
level and contrast it with the non-institutional actions by non-institutional actors at 
the domestic level. Despite it being unusual, I believe that this connection provides a 
fertile ground to assess the potential and limitations of the language of international 
law as it strengthens the argument for an inclusion of victims’ presence at the ICC.  
The connection of international law with local practices has been addressed in 
different ways and through different disciplines. In anthropology, several works have 
sought to track the connections between the global and the local with regard to human 
rights.34 In this area, Sally Engle Merry’s work is worth mentioning as it coins the 
concept of ‘vernacularisation’ to refer to the process through which the language and 
institutions of human rights are adapted to local realities.35 She focused on the role of 
intermediaries such as community leaders, people participating in NGOs, or activists 
in ‘translating’ the concepts from the global to the local and back. In this context, ideas 
from transnational sources are vernacularised, that is, adapted to local institutions and 
meanings. But this process, she said, ‘falls along a continuum depending on how ex-
tensively local cultural forms and practices are incorporated into imported institu-
tions’.36 In this way, they could be simply replicated, if the imported institution re-
mains untouched and the adaptation is superficial; or hybridisation may occur, that is, 
local symbols and institutions may merge with the ones imported for the purposes of 
the human right intervention.37 
                                               
34 Two important compilations in this area are: Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: 
Tracking Law between the Global and the Local (Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Mark Goodale (ed) Human Rights: An 
Anthropological Reader (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). 
35 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ (2006) 108 American An-
thropologist 38. 
36 Ibid, 44. 
37 Ibid. 
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Other example of this connection is Luis Eslava’s work — a legal scholar drawing 
on insights from different disciplines — who focuses on the ways in which interna-
tional law reflects in everyday practices, not necessarily connected to extraordinary 
and crisis-oriented description and events, such as global summits, international inter-
ventions, or international criminal tribunals.38 In his work, he shows that international 
law shapes everyday practices by ordinary people in often unnoticed ways. Focusing 
on how international law shapes ordinary practices that, in principle, appear as abso-
lutely unrelated to it, reveals its pervasive effect in the globalised context.  
In turn, with an emphasis on social movements, Neil Stammers focuses on con-
necting the question of human rights with social movements and seeks to unveil in 
which way human rights have actually been shaped by social movements’ actions.39 In 
his view, both academic disciplinarity and the ideological predispositions and commit-
ments of the authors have shaped the way that human rights are studied and under-
stood, and obscured the role that innovative and creative social movements have had 
in shaping ideas and practices of human rights.40  
Moreover, a number of works have developed an approach that has been known 
as ‘from below,’ an expression increasingly used to refer to: 
‘a “resistant” or “mobilising” character to the actions of community, civil society and other non-
state actors in their opposition to powerful hegemonic political, social or economic forces.’41?
Taking this approach, Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito propose a bottom-up ap-
proach to law and globalisation.42 This approach focuses on the empirical study of 
domestic practice by oppressed groups — from grassroots organisation to community 
leaders — that use or create law in their struggles to resist the effects of neo-liberal 
                                               
38 For instance, Luis Eslava, ‘Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of International Law’ (2014) 2 Lon-
don Review of International Law 3. 
39 Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press, 2009). 
40 Ibid, 9-18. 
41 Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, ‘Transitional Justice From Below: an agenda for research, policy and praxis’ in 
Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds) Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart, 
2008), 3. In what follows I use the terms ‘from below’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach indistinctively.  
42 Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization From Below: Towards a cosmopol-
itan legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4-5. 
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legality.43 This empirical study is meant to counter the hegemonic nature of neo-liberal 
legality which makes invisible third-world resistance that creates non-official forms of 
law.44 Similarly, Rajagopal contends that dominant approaches to international law fail 
to consider a subaltern perspective that would enable to appreciate the role that social 
movements have in the development of international law.45 In his view, only certain 
forms of resistance have been granted legitimacy, the main being the discourse of 
human rights.46 Popular resistance by social movements, must be considered to re-
think human rights in international law by studying it in concrete contexts to under-
stand how these concrete strategies often constitute ‘another kind of human rights, 
aimed at building radical alternatives to the received models of markets and democ-
racy.’47 He calls for the development of a theory of resistance in international law, a 
theory that, in his view, should pay attention to at least for questions: against what 
resistance is exercised; to what end; using which strategies; and what role does the 
postcolonial state have in resistance.48 
In contrast with this approach from below, in the specific context of the ICC, do-
mestic practices are often viewed following a top-down approach. For instance, an 
important aspect of the way in which the connection with local communities has been 
framed in the context of the ICC is the principle of complementarity. According to 
this principle, the jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national criminal juris-
dictions.49 This means that national jurisdictions — and not the international jurisdic-
tion — have a primary role in the prosecution of the crimes contained in the Rome 
Statute. In practice, this is evaluated during the exam of admissibility according to 
                                               
43 Ibid, 10. 
44 Ibid, 5-12. 
45 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law From Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 1. 
46 Ibid, 9. 
47 Ibid, 170. 
48 Ibid, 13. 
49 See: Sarah Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 35 and Rome Statute, Pre-
amble and Article 1. The notion that the Court is complementary of national jurisdictions is a departure from the practice 
of the earlier ad hoc tribunals that had primacy over national jurisdictions. I thank Immi Tallgren for this precision. 
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which, the Court determines that a case is inadmissible if it is being or has been inves-
tigated or prosecuted by a national jurisdiction, or the person has already been tried 
for the conduct. Even when those elements are there, however, the Court may still, 
determine that the case is admissible if the state is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry 
out investigations or prosecutions.50 But the principle of complementarity, has also 
been interpreted as possibly having a catalysing effect at the domestic level, which 
would materialise in domestic prosecutions and investigations as well as reforms to 
the domestic justice system.51 In turn, the concept of ‘positive’ complementarity takes 
this idea a step further as it entails that notion in which the Court has a more active 
role, ‘not merely stepping in where national courts fail to prosecute, but actively en-
couraging prosecutions by national governments of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion.’52 In this way, local practices — in this context, restricted to national criminal 
prosecutions — are often viewed as influenced by international criminal law’s devel-
opments.  
Thus, despite the fact that the principle of complementarity puts local jurisdictions 
over the international jurisdiction of the ICC, the way in which the connection of the 
ICC with local communities has been explored is often defined by two elements: First, 
the notion that international law is an external force from above that influences do-
mestic law; and second, a focus on domestic practices understood as institutional or 
jurisdictional responses, and more specifically, criminal prosecutions. Thus, a com-
mon approach concerning the issue of complementarity has been on the domestic 
prosecution of crimes under the Rome Statute and the assessment of their sufficiency 
                                               
50 Article 17 of the Rome Statute.  
51 Nouwen, supra note 4925 at 9. 
52 William W. Burke-White, ‘Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice’ (2008) 
19 Criminal Law Forum 59, 60. 
 14 
in satisfying the threshold of the Court.53 Also, some works have explored how inter-
national criminal prosecution influences local prosecution of international crimes.54 A 
similar top-down approach can be observed with regard to the criteria for the prose-
cutorial decision of not proceeding with an investigation or prosecution when these 
may not be in the interests of justice (article 53 of the Rome Statute). This question has 
been explored specially with connection to the situation of Uganda and its peace pro-
cess, in which the possibility of granting amnesties to the commanders indicted by the 
ICC was being discussed. Here, the question explored was how the intervention of 
the Court may or may not have been in the interest of justice as it may have interfered 
with the local peace processes. Moreover, traditional methods for dispute resolution 
were also being assessed as alternatives to prosecution.55 
Finally, though not so researched, attention to local realities also takes place as the 
Court itself aims at reaching local communities through outreach activities.56 Outreach 
encompasses those actions aimed at making the Court’s judicial proceedings accessible 
                                               
53 On the principle of complementarity: Rober Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007) 127 et seq. Example of this approach are: Luke Moffett, ‘Complementarity's Monopoly 
on Justice in Uganda: The International Criminal Court, Victims and Thomas Kwoyelo’ (2016) 16 International Criminal 
Law Review 503; G Dancy and F Montal, ‘Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why International Criminal Court 
Investigations May Increase Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions’ (2017) 111 American Journal of International Law 689; 
Brighton Claire, ‘Avoiding Unwillingness: Addressing the Political Pitfalls Inherent in the Complementarity Regime of 
the International Criminal Court’ (2102) 12 International Criminal Law Review 629; connecting the idea of complementarity 
with a focus on domestic traditional mechanisms and the provision of article 53 see: Michael A. Newton, ‘A synthesis 
of community-based justice and complementarity’ in Court’ in C. De Vos et al (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and 
Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
54 See for instance, various contributions to the topic: ‘The Impact of International Criminal Proceedings in Mass Atroc-
ity Cases’ in the proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 2009. Various authors, 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) Vol. 103, 2009 (Published by: Cambridge 
University Press), 203-226. Putting to test the assumption of the catalysing effect of ICC intervention: Nouwen, supra 
note 49. Darryl Robinson, ‘Serving the Interest of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal 
Court’ in Joanna Harrington et al (eds) Bringing Power to Justice? : The Prospects of the International Criminal Court (McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2006).  
55 Branch, supra note 32; Terry Beitzel and Tammy Castle, ‘Achieving Justice through the International Criminal Court 
in Northern Uganda: Is Indigenous/Restorative Justice a Better Approach’ (2013) 23 International Criminal Justice Review 
41; Ketty Anyeko et al, ‘”The Cooling of Hearts”: Community Truth-Telling in Northern Uganda’ (2012) 13 Human 
Rights Review 107; Amelia Katan and Daniel Komakech, ‘Peace and Prosecution: An Analysis of Perceptions Towards 
the International Criminal Court Intervention’s in Northern Uganda’ (2017) 10 African Journal of Criminology and Justice 
Studies 1; Steven C. Roach, ‘Multilayered Justice in Northern Uganda: ICC Intervention and Local Procedures of Ac-
countability’ Thordis Ingadottir et al (eds) The Realities of International Criminal Justice (Brill, Nijhoff, 2013). 
56 Some works discussing outreach are: M. Hellman, ‘Challenges and limitations of outreach. From the ICTY to the ICC’ 
in C. De Vos et al (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); Norman Henry Pentelovitch, Seeing justice done: the importance of prioritising outreach efforts 
at international criminal tribunals (2008) 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 445.  
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to those communities affected by the situations and cases before the Court.57 For this 
reason, the attention to the local here is not focused on national prosecutions, but 
instead, on non-institutional actors and non-governmental organisations. Here, the 
question is how better mechanisms of communication of the Court’s work can im-
prove its legitimacy in the affected communities.58 As I discuss in Article I of this 
thesis, the overall assumption of the ICC’s outreach activities, is that if local commu-
nities have a better understanding of the Courts’ activities their confidence in the 
Court will increase.  
Finally, victims’ needs and perceptions have been studied as they could or should 
influence the way reparations are implemented. This question has been explored by 
the Court itself, for instance, in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Trust 
Fund for Victims organised missions on the ground aimed at seeking victims views 
for the purposes of designing its implementation plans.59 In other cases, NGOs and 
Universities have undertaken studies to ascertain the needs of victims in relation with 
certain cases or situations before the ICC. 
So, overall there is a tendency to adopt a top-down approach when focusing on 
the study of domestic practices in relation to the workings of the ICC, but there are 
some exceptions. For instance, focusing specifically on the International Criminal 
Court and Sub-Saharan Africa, Kamari Clarke problematises even further the relations 
between the international and the local. She explores the frictions that the Court’s 
intervention produces with regard to different questions, such as the role of NGOs, 
the role of the victim in international justice, the relationship between traditional 
methods of conflict resolution and the ICC, among others.60 She contends that, at the 
                                               
57 ICC, Regulations of the Registry (ICC-BD/03-03-13) Regulation 5bis.3. I discuss the question of Outreach in Article 
I.  
58 I discuss the problems of this assumption in Article I. 
59 See for instance: Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, First submission of victim dossiers, ICC-01/04-01/06-3208, TFV, 
31 May 2016;  
60 Kamari Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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intersection of the global and the local, there are conceptions of justice that are cul-
turally constituted. In this context, local practices are ‘neither merely shaped by trans-
national relations nor are they merely translated by local agents into vernacularised 
forms,’ instead, there are multiple domains of interconnection that allow for notions 
of law and justice to travel.61 Similarly, Phil Clark focuses on different intersections 
between the ICC’s work and African domestic actors, institutions, networks and pro-
cesses, including the study of a diversity of actors from institutional to non-institu-
tional ones or ‘every-day citizens’ from both the capital and villages.62 As a result of 
this work, Clark submits that even though the ICC describes its relation to domestic 
actors and institutions in terms of complementarity, in practice, it adopts a ‘distanced 
approach to justice, seeing itself as superior to the domestic realm and often actively 
undermining it.’63 Moreover, Clark suggests that the ICC has often undermined com-
munity-based practices that entail a different way to resolve the conflicts that the ICC 
deals with. The multi-sited methodology of this authors’ contribution combines a top-
down approach with a careful consideration of local non-institutional actors in order 
to understand how the ICC shapes African politics but at the same time how the ICC 
is shaped by Africa.64 
This thesis adopts an approach from below which contrast with the prevailing ap-
proach from above, which considers international law as an external force shaping do-
mestic practices. This has two consequences. First, domestic practices are considered 
as important in that the use of international law may not reduce itself to wielding its 
concepts against domestic powerful actors. Instead, by paying a close look to these 
practices, this thesis concludes that they may also entail to produce meanings. Second, 
local practices are considered as potentially shaping of international law. I begin by 
looking at international law in the first article and then proceed to examine how local 
                                               
61 Ibid, 6. 
62 Phil Clark, Distant Justice The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 
6-8. 
63 Ibid, 17. 
64 Ibid, 11. 
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practices incorporate the language of international law in their own struggles in mean-
ing-creating ways. Though there are a number of works using this approach, it would 
be inaccurate to say that there is a unitary approach from below and, in writing the dif-
ferent articles that compose this thesis, I have gradually defined mine. In my view, 
evaluating local practices as potentially contributing to international law’s develop-
ment requires to redirect our gaze to local actors’ potential to, as I propose in Article 
III, ‘manipulate’ international law.65  
Moreover, focusing on local practices does not deny the fact that the creation of 
an institution such as the ICC may have the effect of influencing the way in which 
domestic responses to mass atrocities are discussed and implemented. While accepting 
that this is a reality in some cases, such as in the case of Colombia,66 this thesis seeks 
to pay attention to other practices that may also be influential but that are normally 
obscured in a focus that privileges institutional practices. In this sense, I have found 
that anthropological perspectives are specially inspiring and influential in the way I 
conceive the relation of the local and international law. As I will explain further in 
Section 3 of this report, I have used a variety of methods for the articles, but I have 
not used ethnography. If anything, I have used ethnographies done by anthropologists 
that focus on studying experiences of victims of mass atrocities in Colombia. In this 
sense, this thesis attempts to consider these works and its implications as relevant for 
the understanding of the complex connections between international law and domes-
tic practices.  
My approach is similar to Eslava’s in that it does not focus on institutional actors 
and actions, but rather, on how groups of victims of mass atrocities in Colombia make 
use of international law as tools for framing their demands of justice. It is different, in 
that it places attention on events that can be considered as extraordinary as they are 
                                               
65 This is a suggestion I made in Article III. Here, ‘manipulative’ is not meant in a negative way, but instead, as referring 
to the skill of handling a tool, in this case, a legal category, in a skilful manner. 
66 See for instance: Easterday, supra note 21; Isabella Bueno and Andrea Diaz Rozas, ‘Which Approach to Justice in 
Colombia under the Era of the ICC’ in Thordis Ingadottir, James Meernik, and Dawn Rothe. The Realities of International 
Criminal Justice (Brill Nijhoff, 2013). 
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linked with mass atrocities. At the same time, my approach is similar to Stammers in 
that it focuses on actions that can be considered agentic and assumes that some degree 
of social change is possible.67 In this sense, the use of international law concepts by 
victims of mass atrocities may have effects in modifying practices, laws, or policies by 
institutions. The extent to which this social change is possible through law is a matter 
that I will return to towards the end of this summarising text when I discuss the pos-
sibility of emancipation, as it constitutes one of the important reflections that arise 
from this thesis.  
Finally, an important consideration in this thesis is that, just as victims are invoked 
by different actors in international law to legitimise their actions, victims of mass 
atrocities sometimes also invoke international law to legitimise their demands of jus-
tice. As the actions of different actors in international law become justified because they 
are done on behalf of the victims, the actions of victims of mass atrocities may become 
influential because they invoke international law. It is here, where the political motiva-
tions and political effects of victims’ actions in using the law, can be discerned. And it 
is because of this that I decided to study cases of victims of mass atrocities who use 
the category of victim, in Colombia.68  
The contents of this summarising report 
This thesis is comprised of four original articles and this summarising report. Ar-
ticle I focuses in theoretical questions around the concept of the political subject as 
developed by Jacques Rancière and proposes a reflection on victims’ participation at 
the ICC in light of such concept. The three subsequent articles, in turn, focus on the 
local practices of victims of mass atrocities in the context of Colombia’s internal armed 
conflict and transitional scenario. In this report, my aim is to build a bridge between 
the two poles of my thesis, namely the international and the local, all through critical 
                                               
67 Stammers, supra note 39 at 24. 
68 I reflect further on the choice of Colombia, in the method section. For a context of the internal armed conflict see 
Articles II, III and IV. 
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lenses. On the one hand, victims represent an important legitimising token for inter-
national organisations, in particular the ICC, which relies on an identity of the victim 
that is built in the discourses of others, and in the near utter absence of actual victims. 
On the other, international law represents an important element that allows victims’ 
claims to gain legitimacy and potentially influence political discussions domestically. 
The contents of this summarising report are as follows. First, I present a brief 
description of the articles situating them within the route of my intellectual journey. 
Here, before describing the articles, I begin by reflecting about some of the character-
istics of this intellectual process (Section 2). Next, I present methodological consider-
ations by first describing in more depth the approach of this thesis and its two major 
influences, namely the critical and the approach from below (Section 3). I then go on to 
describe the methods applied and sources used in each of the articles. Finally, I dedi-
cate a core section of this report to highlighting how the local cases of victims of mass 
atrocities can be relevant to think about international law (Section 4). In order to do 
this, I focus on different concepts that emerge from the articles, through which I re-
flect about the question of the victim of mass atrocity between the local and the inter-
national. Specifically, I will reflect about victims of mass atrocities first as political 
subjects, then as subalterns, and finally as an identity. In the conclusions, I reflect 
about an assumption of this thesis, namely that the actions of victims of mass atrocities 
that invoke the category of victim itself and the legal framework that deals with it, may 
change the norms, their interpretations, and practices associated to such norms. This 
is done through pondering about the concept of emancipation as developed by two 
authors that influenced the approach in this thesis, namely Jacques Rancière and 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos. By exploring the main differences between these two 
approaches, I am able to ascertain my own positioning and suggest that these actions 
of victims of mass atrocities can be emancipating in that, through the process of wield-
ing this category, they may achieve cultural change and find articulation for their own 
identities and the stories that precede them.?  
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2. The articles and a description of my intellectual journey 
In this section, I will describe the different articles that compose the thesis. I would 
like to do it in a way that also enables me to describe my intellectual journey and how 
I came to formulate each of the articles. Before I do that, however, I would like to 
reflect upon three related ideas that can better describe the way in which this intellec-
tual journey took place. These are not meant to be, at this point, methodological con-
siderations.69 Instead, for the moment, these reflections will simply explicit my raw — 
and perhaps even naïve — sensitivities towards my research. I wish to make them 
explicit as an act of honesty towards myself, my peers, and other doctoral students 
that may read these words. 
A non-linear research process  
As described in the introduction, throughout the years of my doctoral studies, I 
rehearsed different approaches to the issue of victims of mass atrocities in interna-
tional law. As I found an approach I felt comfortable with, re-assessing it was a con-
stant exercise. Because of that, the process of writing the papers that compose this 
thesis was not linear. Instead, it was a constant back and forth iteration through which 
I continuously challenged my previous ideas and reassessed what I had thought in the 
past. I am aware that this is not a particularly original way of doing research. However, 
I find that the non-linearity of the research process is often concealed because research 
is mostly presented as a swift progression, first exposing theoretical considerations, 
then explaining a method that is later applied to a particular object, and finally expos-
ing the conclusions of that operation. My process was far from this and, instead of a 
line, it felt more like a constant oscillation between the different parts of each texts 
and the different texts I was producing.  
The four articles that compose this thesis are a result of such a process. Article I 
was definitely the most challenging, taking on many different revisions as I continued 
                                               
69 Considerations regarding method can be found in Section 4. 
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to work on the subsequent articles. While they all built on the ideas developed in Ar-
ticle I, they also influenced it. In this, the process of presenting my work in different 
colloquia and seminars was particularly fruitful. I encountered misunderstanding, sup-
port, and different suggestions on how to improve or modify my work altogether. 
Similarly, the submissions, revisions, and rejections resulting from the interaction with 
academic journals further contributed to the re-examination of my work and the way 
I was framing my ideas. As I finished working on one manuscript and submitted it to 
an academic journal for the first time, I began to work on the next article. The earlier 
papers came back, with news of rejection or major revision decisions, three or four 
months into working on the following one, in which I had already changed some of 
the views expressed in the first article. I tried to incorporate these new considerations 
into the earlier articles, and this process of revision also helped to rethink the following 
paper. Here, the feedback provided by peer reviewers from the different journals to 
which I submitted my work proved essential, and often motivated the reassessing pro-
cess. 
The initial unawareness of disciplinary boundaries  
In the earlier stages of my doctoral studies, I was very unaware of the boundaries 
that separated different approaches to international law from the different disciplines 
that study topics related to international law. In searching for materials, I encountered 
several different perspectives coming from different disciplines, with different styles, 
using different methods, and reflecting different lenses through which the world is 
viewed. Some of these works, in one way or another, influenced my thinking without 
me being completely aware of how they situated themselves vis-à-vis other works. As I 
went ahead in my research, I often found myself in the situation of describing my 
research to colleagues, and I was often surprised that what I had characterised as being 
a critical research about international law, was often characterised by my interlocutors 
as belonging to different areas of expertise/approaches, such as development, transi-
tional justice, third world approaches, and juridical anthropology, among others.  
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Thus, I first became aware of my utter lack of awareness of the terrain in which 
I was moving. It took time for me to become more mindful of the different influences 
shaping my research and to trace a sort of ‘map’ of the different areas that informed 
it. Certainly, even though there is some anxiety in academia to assign a label to re-
search, the limits that separate one area or field or approach from the other, are not 
as clear as the lines on a map.70 Similarly, there are overlapping labels to assign to a 
work as it is being formulated in a particular discipline (e.g. law) and sub-discipline 
(e.g. public international law) with a particular approach (e.g. critical legal research). 
Despite these caveats, to actually draw a map of the terrain I walked through during 
my doctoral studies, and to locate the position of each article within this map, was an 
important aspect of my intellectual journey. It allowed me to become increasingly 
aware of the different perspectives/disciplines, which in turn, enabled me to better 
interact with my peers, and to understand where their comments came from. It also 
allowed me to gain a stronger sense of where I would position myself within this 
landscape, and what was outside of my positioning.  
Drawing a map in order to be aware of where one is in terms of one’s research, 
is different to drawing it to establish the limitations of one’s research. Thus, regardless 
of my current awareness of these boundaries, I still agree with the idea that a researcher 
should not be so concerned with them if these boundaries represent a limitation to 
her inquiry. As Schultz describes,  
‘the challenge is to ask who we are, where we came from, where we aim to go, and how we aim 
to get there. If one needs to go beyond the narrow boundaries of the analysis of legal materials and 
open up to insights from different disciplines in order to do so, this should not be seen as an abdication 
of authority but rather as a necessary intellectual inquiry into the meaning and purpose of law and its 
application.’71 ?
                                               
70 Just as the map is in itself only a representation of a terrain. Using a metaphor of the law as a map which inspired this 
idea, see: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law’ (1987) 
14 Journal of Law and Society 279. 
71 Thomas Schultz, cited by Bianchi, supra note 25 at 5-6. 
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Thus, though my lack of awareness of the disciplinary boundaries was a cause of 
anxiety at times, and perplexity at others, I consider it a strength of my research be-
cause it allowed me to think of and focus on the problem I was analysing without 
considering the limits of the discipline of law, or the sub-discipline of international 
law, as a restriction. This, in turn allowed me to analyse the questions of this thesis in 
a way that I consider richer in terms of complexity and depth. 
Serendipity in my research  
As stated earlier, the process of my research was not linear, and instead, it can be 
better described as an oscillating process that took me back and forth to reassess con-
stantly and rehearse new possibilities. In this process, serendipity played an important 
role. As I presented parts of my work to different academic circles, I was often asked 
questions such as, Why this author? Why do you need such a framework? The truth is, I do 
not need any such framework. Towards the end of my studies it became increasingly 
clear that I could have arrived at similar conclusions by having read very different 
authors… I just happened to come across a certain text at a given moment, which led 
me to think or re-think the problem I was concerned with in a certain way. Different 
texts allowed me to make sense of — perhaps only intuitive — notions I had not 
clearly articulated in my mind, or they opened a way for me to think differently about 
my topic.  
Of course, this does not mean that I simply incorporated any text that made 
sense to me without questioning how it would suit my purpose or my questions. In 
fact, in earlier versions of some papers, I did try to use frameworks that were eventu-
ally discarded for different reasons. An example of this, is the concept of agency as 
developed by feminist accounts which I explored in order to think of the victims as 
agents. Kathryn Abrams’ work was particularly important, as she argues that tradi-
tional liberal conceptions of autonomy have neglected to consider some attributes of 
human subjects, such as emotional or relational interdependence and strong gender-
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related socialisation.72 In this context, the exercise of autonomy is commonly under-
stood as a process in which the individual discerns her own wishes and desires to make 
free decisions. As a response, social and feminist theorists emphasise the central effect 
of complex social formation within which agency operates. Though these ideas were 
important, I did not analyse the question of victims’ actions through them, as I felt 
that this framework was largely focused on the individual, highlighting the social or 
relational aspects that affect the way individual agency works. Yet, the initial explora-
tion of these ideas allowed me to re-define my inquiry and to differentiate between 
individual or group-based forms of political subjectivity. As such, the cases that I se-
lected all reflect group-based actions instead of individual ones.73 
To this extent, my research process was also delineated by serendipity. Of course, 
this does not mean that serendipity defined altogether the choices of my thesis. In-
stead, my interest in studying the emancipatory potential of the concepts of interna-
tional law for victims of mass atrocity in light of their virtual absence in the ICC was 
the guiding principle that led me to discard some theoretical inspirations and adopt 
others. The sources I eventually used and the works that influenced my work are re-
lated to the specific problems I dealt with. Thus, what this means in practice is that I 
am aware that there are other texts and theories out there that can also be connected 
to these problems. The fact that I have chosen these specific ones is partly a decision, 
but it is also the result of serendipity. In other words, the texts I use and cite to back 
my theoretical arguments are the ones that inspired those arguments, but one could 
have arrived those same arguments, or similar ones, using other theoretical back-
grounds. 
The articles 
As explained earlier in the introduction, after rehearsing and discarding other ways 
of approaching the topic of victims of mass atrocities, I began by inquiring into the 
                                               
72 Kathryn Abrams, ‘From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist perspectives on self-direction’ (1998-1999) 40 William and 
Mary Law Review 805.  
73 In article IV, however, I did zoom out to cover a wider spectrum, including also the actions of individual victims as 
actions that contributed to the formation of the disputed identity of the victim. 
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concept of ‘the victim’ in human rights law. Among the different overlapping areas of 
the law that deal with victims of mass atrocities, international human rights law is 
perhaps the most influential as individual persons are its ‘fundamental units of analy-
sis.’74 But the individual person that is generally allowed to present claims before in-
ternational institutions,75 is the one ‘who is capable of recognizing himself as a vic-
tim.’76 I studied different criticisms that resonated with my thinking about the notion 
of the victim in human rights law and its effects. According to these criticisms, the 
notion of victim often relies on the construction of a helpless and passive subject that 
is unable to enact her own rights.77 This notion grants legitimacy to different kinds of 
actions, coming from actors who are not necessarily victims themselves but whose 
actions are justified to the extent that they are done on behalf of victims.78 Victims, 
then, become a legitimising token. This is true for international criminal law, where an 
abstract notion of the victims is constantly invoked by others, but the actual victims 
rarely appear.79 Some of these criticisms come from approaches to international law, 
such as critical legal studies and third world approaches,80 others come from political 
philosophy,81 and anthropology.82 Similar criticisms can also be found for the notion 
of victim in international humanitarian law,83 international criminal law84 and transi-
tional justice.85  
                                               
74 Urueña, supra note 3225 at 100. 
75 Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham, International Human Rights Lexicon (Oxford University Press, 2005), 403. 
76 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An essay on the understanding of evil (Verso, 2001), 10. 
77 E.g., Wilson, supra note 32; Fassin supra note 4; Clarke, supra note 60. 
78 The humanitarian act of identification with the victim, in the words of Meister, ‘is also the ideological basis for using 
military force against those whom we believe to have forfeited their claims to a common humanity by avowing and/or 
acting upon these forbidden desires. The tragic irony’ — he concludes — ‘is that our own atrocities become (indirectly) 
thinkable by projecting the desires to commit atrocity on our enemy.’ Robert Meister, ‘Human Rights and the Politics 
of Victimhood’ (2002) 16 Ethics & International Affairs 91, 102. 
79 Fletcher supra note 27; Emily Haslam, ‘Subjects and Objects: International Criminal Law and the Institutionalization 
of Civil Society’ (2011) 5 International Journal of Transitional Justice 221; Kendall and Nouwen, supra note 27. 
80 E.g., Urueña, supra note 3225 at 93 et seq; Mutua, supra note 32. 
81 E.g., Badiou, supra note 76 at 10-14. 
82 E.g., Wilson, supra note 32; Fassin supra note 4; Clarke, supra note 60. 
83 Valerie M. Meredith, ‘Victim Identity and Respect for Human Dignity: A terminological analysis’ (2009) 91 International 
Review of the Red Cross 259. 
84 Fletcher, supra note 27; Haslam, supra note 79; Kendall and Nouwen, supra note 27; Schwöbel-Patel, supra note 30. 
85 E.g., Tsepo Madlingozi, ‘On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims’ (2010) 2 Journal of 
Human Rights Practice 208; Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency 
and Blame’ (2013) 22 Social & Legal Studies 489. 
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However, I was not fully satisfied with the description that the effects of the dis-
course of human rights, in building a victim that is essentially passive and defenceless, 
were completely undesirable.86 Having grown up in Chile, I had observed for years 
that the language of human rights worked for the actual victims of mass atrocities — 
such as the victims of Pinochet’s dictatorship — to address the society as a whole, 
international organisms, and domestic authorities, by allowing them to present politi-
cal claims. Though I agreed with the criticisms over the effects of constructing vic-
timhood in a certain way, I also believed that there was usefulness in the discourse of 
human rights. Reading Jacques Rancière’s work on politics, allowed me to begin re-
flecting on a philosophical level on how victims of mass atrocity could be considered 
as a political agent when using the language provided by international law. In this 
context, the possibility of formulating claims on a common stage, where political sub-
jects can be heard, is crucial. But this is a possibility that is absent from avenues such 
as the ICC, where victims have virtually no opportunities for self-expression. The re-
sult of these reflections is: Article I ‘Victims of Mass Atrocity: Meaningful partic-
ipation through Rancière’s lens’.  
Thus, Article I begins with a critical legal assessment of the concept of victim in 
human rights, transitional justice and international criminal law, but it incorporates in 
the process ideas of political philosophy to understand how victims can be considered 
as political subjects. Here, the notion of political subjectification, as developed by 
Rancière, is central.87 In his view, the political subject is not a fixed identity but the 
result of a process of subjectification, in which an individual or a group is able to show 
how they are excluded from what counts in society. In a democratic society, this ex-
clusion is a paradox because all these individuals or groups are, in principle, included 
                                               
86 It would be an oversimplification to pretend that this is the necessary outcome of a critique of human rights. As 
highlighted by McLoughlin, ‘post-Marxist thought provides two very different approaches to the political possibilities 
offered by human rights. The first retains a fidelity to the revolutionary critique of rights by rejecting the language and 
conceptuality of human rights as too deeply implicated in the liberal political order that needs to be resisted. The second 
acknowledges the limitations of human rights while arguing that they also offer important tools for democratic political 
struggle.’ Daniel McLoughlin, ‘Post-Marxism and the Politics of Human Rights: Lefort, Badiou, Agamben, Rancière’ 
(2016) 27 Law and Critique 303. 
87 The ideas referred here can be found in different works of Rancière, the one that I considered the most was: Jacques 
Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
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in the political process (as part of the residual category of the demos). However, the 
process of defining categories, identities, permissions and prohibitions, present in 
every society, always produces spaces of exclusion. The political subject appears when 
she is able to show this exclusion in a way that is heard by those in power. The result 
of this is a disturbance in the order of things, which allows us to reassess, re-accom-
modate and modify that order.  
Moreover, an important effect of using Rancière’s work is that, coming from po-
litical philosophy, he works with categories that do not necessarily assign a specific 
realm to the law. Although this may not be exclusive to his work, for me it was a 
strength as it allowed me to view things from a different perspective, which does not 
focus exclusively on the law, and understands it as part of a set of practices, not all 
legal, that establish boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. Indeed, the law, as ‘the guard-
ian of order’88 is an important part of what Rancière calls the ‘police’, which designates 
the institutional order that assigns hierarchies, categories, and names to groups form-
ing a society.89 I found this to be particularly fruitful because the criticisms over the 
category of victim in the discourse of human rights do not relate to its positive content 
but instead, to the way in which victims are represented. And these representations, 
unnoticeable in a strictly legal approach, form part of that ‘police’ order, and are rele-
vant for an analysis of the law because they influence the way the law is interpreted. 
The main findings of Article I relate to the value of the possibility of disruption. In 
the article, I show that victims of mass atrocities do at times embark upon political 
actions, disturbing the swift progression of certain processes. In a Rancièrian ap-
proach, there is value in such disruption, because it allows for a reassessment and 
perhaps a modification of the institutions, the norms and the representations that lie 
beneath them. However, in order to be able to disrupt, political subjects must first be 
able to create a common space in which their speech — normally deemed as ‘noise’ 
                                               
88 Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, ‘Rancière and the legal subject Coming to terms with non-existence,’ in López Lerma, 
Mónica and Etxabe, Julen (eds), Rancière and Law (Taylor & Francis, 2017), 83. 
89 From here on I will refer to the ‘police’ as the ‘institutional’ including in it, the institutions, its agents, their institutional 
practices, and the assumptions upon which these are based. 
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— is heard by power. In the article, I show that the process of the victims’ participa-
tion at the ICC, though seemingly based in the recognition of the victim as a legal 
subject, offers limited opportunities for the victims’ self-expression. I suggest that this 
hinders the very possibility of the political from occurring and that, because of this, it 
is important to provide more opportunities for self-expression. If victims remain in-
voked only by others, they will continue to be represented as defenceless subjects and 
these representations will continue to influence the way norms are interpreted, in a 
sort of vicious cycle that reinforces itself to the detriment of victims.  
The contrast between the ICC — where victims of mass atrocities appear almost 
always represented by others as defenceless and passive — and the actions of victims 
of mass atrocities that were highly political, and thus emancipating, became the main 
interest of my research. My aim was now to contrast the image of the helpless victim 
with the cases where victims of mass atrocities themselves used the language of inter-
national law to frame their demands. I became interested in understanding the con-
crete ways in which victims of mass atrocities used the category of victim from inter-
national law and the (subsequent) effects such uses of this category have had. It is 
because of this that, during a research visit in Colombia, I decided to continue my 
research by studying cases of victims of mass atrocities in that country. Of course, 
approaching the cases had its own challenges that brought new elements to my intel-
lectual journey. I will reflect on the methodological questions in detail in the section 
on method. In this section however, I am interested in reflecting on how approaching 
the cases led me to include elements of analysis in my research.  
Article II, ‘A stubborn victim of mass atrocity: the peace community of San 
José de Apartadó’ was the first case study. As the title suggests, it focuses on a group 
of victims that formed the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, a fascinating 
experiment of a bottom-up created safe area that uses the language of international 
law and that has established a number of unofficial norms that explicitly refer to in-
ternational law. In the article, I show how the Community embodies a special kind of 
victim that is both suffering and stubborn. These two features contradict each other 
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in that victims seem to be expected to behave in a particular way, by accepting the 
government’s aid. Instead, as Colombia began to adopt the language of transitional 
justice in 2005, including reparations to victims of mass atrocities in its legislation, the 
Community cut ties with the government and radicalised its position. What is more, 
the Community added to its duties the rejection of individual reparations. This means 
that, if a member wishes to apply for reparations, they have to leave the Community. 
Though I first learned about the Community through texts analysing its legal as-
pects, I soon realised that there were a number of anthropological works about it. 
Furthermore, when in Colombia, I had the chance to meet with different anthropol-
ogists who had studied and written about the Community. These discussions had a 
profound influence in the way I approached the case of the Community. As a lawyer, 
I would have perhaps been initially more interested in the strictly legal aspects of the 
Community, but a remarkable feature of the Community was precisely how it organ-
ised itself around concepts of international law, such as the principle of distinction 
and the concept of victim, to the point of including them in their own unofficial legal 
texts. These notions are either explicitly referred to or reflected in the duties members 
had to fulfil. Thus, for instance, members of the Community have to abstain from 
carrying any weapons or interacting with any of the armed groups (including the army). 
As a result, the article does not only focus on the use of legal categories before adju-
dicating organs. Instead, it tries to understand the way that the legal categories affect 
the lives of the members of the group in a more encompassing way.  
In studying the case of the Community, I considered their unofficial laws as part 
of the materials that would allow me to understand how the Community related to 
international law. I also considered these unofficial norms, as actual norms in the sense 
that they were followed by Community members and were, at times, even more effec-
tive than official domestic laws, at least in the life of Community members. In studying 
the Community then, I identified three normative orders, namely the international, the 
domestic, and the Community’s unofficial law. In identifying these three normative 
orders, I was influenced by works coming from legal pluralism and legal anthropology 
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as these provided lenses through which the unofficial law created by the Community 
could be assessed in its interactions with official norms, instead of being simply disre-
garded. 
The main findings of this article were that the case of the Community shows that 
the interaction of different — official and unofficial — legal orders can have diverse 
levels and effects, as well as many contradictions. While it is clear that the Community 
is resisting violence, it is not resisting the official law. Instead, through their own ar-
ticulations of this law — in their own unofficial norms — they are strategically select-
ing international law norms that allow them, through the category of victim, to main-
tain neutrality in the conflict. But the Community also has a creative capacity as it 
produces an unofficial law that is based on international norms and develops it further. 
The main example of this is the creation of the Community as a bottom-up safe area 
and of its humanitarian zones. International law is developed through these experi-
ences, regardless of their official recognition. But there is perhaps a more subtle way 
in which the Community engages with a category of international law, specifically with 
the category of victim. In identifying themselves as victims, the innocence and vulner-
ability associated with the category are important factors to differentiate themselves 
from armed groups and find protection. But as victims, the Community does not en-
tirely coincide with the image of a docile, passive, defenceless subject. In acting as a 
‘stubborn’ victim, they are able to influence the very image of victimhood, reshaping 
the contours of the category itself.90 
An important consideration that emerged as I wrote this article is how victims of 
mass atrocities can often be understood as subalterns. I say it ‘emerged’ from the ar-
ticle, because as I wrote it, I realised how important it was for the Community that it 
defined itself as an alternative one. In reading, for instance, interviews with its leader, 
it was clear that this was a central aspect to it. This is, of course, reflected in the article, 
but what remained in the subtext is how this implied that the Community was a group 
                                               
90 I borrow this expression from Laura Quintana, ‘Derechos, desacuerdo y subjetivación política’ in A. Fjeld, L. Quintana 
and Ë. Tassin (eds.), Movimientos Sociales y Subjetivaciones Políticas (2016). 
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of oppressed people who used the language of the law to communicate with the heg-
emonic powers. This aspect will be analysed in this summarising text, as it is one of 
the aspects that I found through the study of the victims as well as a prism through 
which I can understand the use of the category of victim.  
The second case study was Article III — ‘The Category of Victim “From Be-
low”: the Case of the Movement of Victims of State Crimes (MOVICE) in Co-
lombia.’ After working with the case of the Community, I approached the case of 
Movice in a way that is both similar and different. It is similar to the extent that, just 
like in the case of the Community, I tried to focus on the social use of the legal con-
cepts, more than on the way Movice used legal concepts before adjudicating organs. 
Unlike the Community, which had interacted at different times with the regional sys-
tem of human rights, Movice’s actions had a domestic approach, with actions before 
the Constitutional Court. However, there are two reasons why I decided not to pay 
attention to such actions. First, these had been thoroughly studied before.91 Second, 
and more importantly, because of Movice’s organisation, actions before domestic 
courts were conducted in connection with other organisations that also form part of 
Movice. This made it difficult to actually appreciate Movice’s own formulations and 
agenda apart from those of the other organisations.  
Moreover, the case of Movice is different from the case of the Community in dif-
ferent ways. While the Community is a small group, the former is a large movement. 
This means that the Community is much more cohesive than Movice, and its structure 
much simpler and centralised. While the Community is a rural group, Movice has 
members throughout the whole country. This means that all members of the Com-
munity are peasants sharing a similar background and a common story. Instead, Mov-
ice gathers victims of different crimes, caused by two perpetrators, the state and the 
                                               
91 E.g. Gabriel Gómez Sánchez. Justicia Transicional en Disputa (Universidad de Antioquia, 2014), Catalina Diaz, ‘Challeng-
ing Impunity from Below: The Contested Ownership of Transitional Justice in Colombia’ in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna 
McGregor, Transitional Justice from Below (Hart, 2008); Nathalia Sandoval Rojas, Movilizarse ante la corte: trayectoria y efectos de 
tres episodios de movilización legal constitucional de feministas, indígenas y víctimas de crimenes de Estado en Colombia (Uniandes, 2015). 
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paramilitary groups.92 While the Community has only individual members, Movice in-
cludes individuals as well as organisations. All of these features make it much more 
difficult to talk about Movice as a group with a common identity, as in the case of the 
Community. Indeed, because the Community comprises a limited number of mem-
bers, its identity is much richer and complex, and I explore this in Article II. Instead, 
understanding Movice was more about understanding the contexts and effects of the 
movement’s actions in wielding the category of victim in order to discern the meanings 
they created with this use and their impact. 
Thus, in Article III, I focused on three political opportunities in which the move-
ment deployed the concept of victim. First, the moment of their creation in 2005 came 
as a consequence of the approval of the Justice and Peace Law, which incorporated 
for the first time the figure of the victim as a part of the transitional justice discourse. 
In defining the victim, this law excluded victims of state crimes. Only three days after 
the passing of this law, Movice was created as a way to counter the underlying as-
sumption of that law: that paramilitaries and the state had been enemies negotiating a 
peace agreement instead of being, as Movice asserts, complicit in committing crimes 
against civilians. The second moment takes place in 2008, when a rally supported by 
the government against the FARC-EP gained massive attendance and international 
attention. Here, Movice decided to call for a second rally against paramilitary violence, 
one month later. Despite being stigmatised by the government, the march gained mas-
sive support in Colombia, giving visibility and strength to the idea that paramilitaries 
and the state were important armed actors that also affected the civilian population 
with their violence. Third, during the Habana negotiations between the government 
and the FARC-EP, Movice was at the forefront of demands for the inclusion of vic-
tims in the negotiation process. In this opportunity, the group advocated for the in-
clusion of victims of both sides of the negotiating table: the guerrillas and the govern-
ment. Here, the context was substantially different as the legal category of victim now 
                                               
92 Movice treats crimes coming from these two perpetrators as coming from the state. The reason is that they aim at 
highlighting that the state is also responsible for paramilitary violence. 
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included victims of state crimes. The success of adopting the category of victim came 
with a price, however, as now victims had become a sort of legitimation for different 
proposals during the negotiations. 
In analysing a social movement such as Movice in its use of a legal category, I 
ended up resorting to a number of concepts developed by sociologists of social move-
ments. Here, Tarrow’s work was particularly important as it summarises the way in 
which different works have developed categories aimed at explaining the works of 
social movements.93 Moreover, this work builds upon those previous works in order 
to propose a dynamic framework in which the importance of the context in the work-
ings of social movements is highlighted. This was particularly fruitful as Movice’s 
work, and the contentious character of its actions, can only be understood if the con-
text of their actions is analysed. Moreover, understanding the movement’s actions as 
essentially contentious,94 allowed me to make sense of the non-institutional means that 
Movice uses and the ways in which the category of victim, and its associated legal 
frameworks, can be used to create meanings and to frame their demands. The fact 
that the category of victim comes from a human rights framework, moreover, pro-
vides legitimacy to the movement. 
The main finding of the article is that the category of victim allows the movement 
to introduce claims that relate to their own struggles and that are not strictly part of 
the content of that category. I suggest that these three moments show that Movice’s 
use of the category of victim is highly strategic. On the one hand, identifying them-
selves as victims and using the language of international law grants them a veil of 
legitimacy to address power. On the other, grounding the category of victim in the 
domestic context allows them to discuss the circumstances surrounding the violations, 
such as the identity of the perpetrator, the modes of perpetration, and the connections 
                                               
93 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics (3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
94 According to Tarrow, ‘collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to 
representative institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally 
challenge others or authorities.’ Ibid, 7. 
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between different perpetrators. In the context of Colombia, this opens up the possi-
bility to suggest different narratives of the conflict, which is precisely what Movice 
does. For them, the category works as a sort of Trojan horse, through which they can 
introduce other deeper claims of justice. I suggest that, in infusing meanings to the 
legal category, the use that this organisation makes of legal categories is emancipatory. 
Finally, Article IV ‘The disputed identity of the victim of mass atrocity and 
the strategic use of international legal concepts in Colombia’, is an effort to think 
on the effects of the use of legal categories by grassroots organisations and individual 
victims. It is perhaps the most ambitious article as it attempts to zoom out and cover 
a greater perspective than the previous two articles of cases in Colombia. While I had 
previously reflected on the cases of two groups, in this paper I also examine how 
individual victims interact with the system in accepting the benefits offered to victims 
of mass atrocities in Colombia. I describe the sinuous trajectory of the category of 
victim from international law, to victims and NGOs, to domestic law, as well as the 
way in which victims of mass atrocity interact with the category in domestic law either 
by accepting it in order to obtain the benefits offered by the state, or by challenging 
it. When challenging the category, victims of mass atrocity can continue to resort to 
international law as a mechanism that provides legitimacy as well as indeterminacy to 
sustain different — and at times contradicting — claims.  
These are, of course, ideas that I had been grasping at in the earlier articles. In this 
article, however, I sought to also reflect on the effects of the varying interactions be-
tween the different victims and the state, around the category of the victim of mass 
atrocity. What I observed in different works that have documented these interactions 
is that victims who accept the domestically constructed category of the victim, recog-
nise the state as the one who is legitimised to administer their stories of suffering, to 
define which stories qualify, and how to tell them.95 In turn, following the analysis of 
                                               
95 Fredy Mora-Gámez, ‘Reconocimiento de víctimas del conflicto armado en Colombia: Sobre tecnologías de repre-
sentación y configuraciones de Estado’ (2016) 82 Universitas Humanística 75, 95. 
 35 
Jaramillo,96 when the state recognises a certain debt to the victim in principle, it seems 
as if it is putting itself in a hierarchical relation towards the victims in which these have 
a seemingly higher status. But, unlike other debtors, the state is able to both 
acknowledge the debt and postpone — or simply fail to fulfil — payment. In failing 
to pay it — as is the case for most victims in Colombia — the State is not really putting 
itself in a lower hierarchy, but on the contrary, it reinforces its authority.97 The victim 
that emerges from this interplay is a victim who recognisnmes the state as the legiti-
mate authority to interpret and administer her stories of suffering, in exchange for a 
promise of redress that does not arrive. This situation, I believe, reinforces the stere-
otype of the victim as a defenceless, passive, and docile subject. 
Moreover, victims who challenge the category as constructed domestically, prob-
lematise its contents, its contexts, and its effects. These victims, such as the ones in 
the two previous articles, use the category of victim from international law to suggest 
the inclusion of different features of victimhood, such as, gender, or political agency, 
or to suggest a different context that needs to be considered, such as, historical peasant 
struggles, or the systematic persecution of political opposition. The identity that 
emerges from these actions is highly political and agentic. 
The main finding of this article is that the different uses of the category of victim 
contribute to the construction of an identity associated to that category. In the differ-
ent ways in which actors wield the category of victim, an identity of the victim of mass 
atrocities emerges, an identity that is always in dispute, and never fully achieved.98 I 
suggest that, for victims, this means that the use of international law to frame their 
claims of justice has an enabling effect in that it allows them to introduce claims that 
are different from the mere assertion of victimhood. In this, the indeterminacy of the 
international norm allows them to introduce specific claims that relate to their own 
                                               
96 Pablo Jaramillo, ‘Deuda, desesperación y reparaciones inconclusas en la Guajira, Colombia,’ (2012) 14 Antípoda 41. 
97 Ibid, 41 and 55. 
98 In this idea, one article was particularly influential: Stuart Hall, ‘Introduction: Who Needs Identity?’ In: Stuart Hall 
and Paul Du Gay (eds) Questions of Cultural Identity (Sage, 1996). 
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conceptions of justice, which may differ from the prevailing conceptions that may be 
the basis for a certain norm or its interpretation.99 This is a strategic use of the inter-
national norm. Yet the state can also respond strategically by complying with the legal 
standards without necessarily addressing the deeper claims. It is here where the use of 
international law finds an important limit because the institutional responses, often 
sought by the groups wielding international law categories, can also use international 
law’s indeterminacy by arguing compliance without necessarily addressing the other 
meanings infused by victims. However, despite this limit, the use of international law 
is still important as it allows victims to introduce their claims into the political debate 
and to slowly challenge the identity of the victim as presented by the state. In this back 
and forth movement, the disputed identity of the victim has, as one of its elements, 
the very struggle of the victims themselves. 
?  
                                               
99 Furthermore, indeterminacy allows for different meanings to be infused when wielding the category of victim. This 
means that contestations does not necessarily go in one direction from the victims as a homogenous group against the 
state. It is truth that, in this dissertation, the cases feature victims wielding the category of victim against the state, but 
one should look at the larger context. As such, the identity of the victim can be infused with meanings that may under-
mine the very status of other victims. In Colombia, because of the existence of different armed groups (state, guerrilla 
and paramilitary groups) this is actually the case. While there are few that would challenge the status of guerrilla victims, 
the struggle of Movice (Article III) was initially a struggle for recognition of their status as victims in a context that did 
not recognised the existence of state crimes. Moreover, both Movice and the Community of Peace (Article II) are often 
suspected — sometimes by other victims - of belonging or sympathising with the guerrilla, which would undermine their 
status as victims. Another case is the one of victims who belong to the army, and who, perhaps in light of the visibility 
acquired by cases of victims of state crimes, have begun to assert their own identity as victims. This need to assert this 
identity could also be seen in connection with a context in which, as a result of victims’ activism, several cases revealed 
the responsibility of Colombian security forces in extrajudicial killings. An example of this is the so called ’false positives’ 
which describes a widespread practice in which random people — often of poor background - were kidnapped, killed, 
and dressed as guerrilleros by security forces in order to respond to the pressures of the institution to increase their body 
counts of guerrilla members killed. See: Nathalie Pabón Ayala et al, Memoria y Víctimas en las Fuerzas Militares (Editorial 
Universidad del Rosario, 2018); Omar Eduardo Rojas Bolaños and Fabián Leonardo Benavides Silva, Ejecuciones Extra-
judiciales en Colombia 2002-2010 (Ediciones USTA, 2017). 
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3. Method 
In this section I would like to reflect on questions of method on two levels. First, a 
general level, in which I identify two different approaches that have influenced this 
thesis as a whole and that explain the research choices made. To say that they have 
influenced the thesis means that they have affected the way in which I have thought 
about the question of victims of mass atrocities, but that they have not necessarily 
determined it.100 Second, on a more specific level, I will explain the way in which these 
two approaches reflected upon the decisions made in each article, which sources were 
used, and the challenges encountered. 
A critical approach and Article I 
This thesis is premised upon a critical approach to the law. What does that mean? 
In this section I reflect upon two different ways in which this thesis is critical, a ‘softer’ 
sense and a ‘stronger’ one which, in turn, implies at least three different questions. In 
a softer sense, all research at the doctoral level is expected to be ‘critical.’101 As Mink-
kinen puts it, ‘critical judgement” is a generic intellectual skill that all researchers are 
supposed to be able to apply in relation to the object of their research.’102 Thus, in this 
‘softer’ sense, being critical entails an ‘attitude and a willingness to continuously ques-
tion and to be put into question,’103 which was precisely what I described in Section 
3.1 when I discussed what I called the non-linearity of research. Though described 
there in terms of its temporality, this non-linearity implied an attitude of openness not 
only to be put into question by others, but also, to put myself into question. Taking 
others’ criticisms seriously, involved embarking upon a process of thought that al-
lowed me to reformulate several times my own ideas and preconceptions, and ‘become 
                                               
100 An example of this is the critical approach. While some contend that a critical approach should not propose solutions, 
I did propose a specific suggestion in my first article, namely that victims of mass atrocities should be granted more 
opportunities for self-expression in the international criminal court.  
101 Panu Minkkinen, ‘Critical legal “method” as attitude,’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds) Research Methods in 
Law (Routledge, 2013), 119.  
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid, 135. 
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aware of the self-imposed limitations’ that prevented me from seeing a wider pic-
ture.104 In this process, a crucial element was the interaction with other researchers 
and scholars who studied the law from the standpoint of extra-legal disciplines, such 
as anthropology, philosophy, and sociology. 
But, even though my research is critical also in this ‘softer’ sense, in this section, I 
am more interested in fleshing out the ‘stronger’ meaning of a critical approach and 
its consequences. In this sense, being critical first means to refute the idea that my 
own positioning towards my research comes from a neutral place from which I then 
pick a method to apply to my research in the assumption that the outcome will be 
objective. Moreover, even though some publications about method have in fact in-
cluded the ‘critical method’ as a part of the variety of methods the scholar can choose 
to apply to her research, such a thing as a coherent ‘critical legal method’ does not 
really exist.105 As Koskenniemi has argued, this idea entails an assumption ‘that there 
is some overarching standpoint, some nonmethodological (sic) method, a nonpolitical 
academic standard that allows that method or politics to be discussed from the outside 
of particular methodological or political controversies.’106 This is the reason why I 
have made a concerted effort to explicitly reflect upon my own experience of research, 
its challenges, and its pitfalls.  
 A second consequence of this ‘stronger’ sense in which my approach is critical, is 
that it evaluates the law ‘not as apolitical and objective’107 but as profoundly pierced 
by political questions of power, inclusion and exclusion. Being critical, in this sense, 
entails to be critical of something, namely the traditional view of the mainstream lawyer 
that views the law as ‘an autonomous, rational, consistent and coherent system of 
                                               
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid, 120; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the Editors of the Symposium’  (1999) 93 The American Journal of International 
Law 351, 352; also, Kaarlo Tuori, ‘Law, Power and Critique,’ in Kaarlo Tuori et seq (eds) Law and Power: Critical and Socio-
Legal Essays. (Deborah Charles Publications, 1997) at 29: ‘there is no single Narrative told by the critical legal scholar, 
only narratives by legal scholars.’ 
106 Koskenniemi, supra note 105 at 352. 
107 Singer, supra note 29 at 5. 
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norms.’108 This traditional view puts questions of power outside the realm of the law, 
perhaps including it only in discussions with reference to the coercion needed in order 
to guarantee the realisation of the law, or to the way the law acts as a limit to power.109 
In contrast, the standpoint through which I approach the law in this thesis aims at 
viewing the law as an expression of power itself, and is thus critical of the ‘alleged 
objectivity and neutrality of the law.’110 This entails an effort to see the law in its con-
text and understand how the law can help draw boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
that are defined by the letter of the law but also, by the social practices that surround 
its application.  
Finally, a more implicit consequence is that this critical approach entails taking a 
perspective through which the law is treated as a discourse. Certainly, though critical 
studies commonly see the law as a discourse, treating the law as a discourse does not 
always imply a critical stance towards it.111 In my case, the understanding of the law as 
a discourse did not occur as an explicit methodological decision. Instead, it reflects an 
analytical standpoint that was the influence of different critical works that resonated 
with my ideas, which implicitly led me to understand the law as a discourse encom-
passing ‘an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemina-
tion, and reception.’112 In this sense, understanding the law as discourse entails the 
rejection of the notion that the text of the law has meaning in a vacuum that can be 
discerned solely through its reading. Instead, it implies accepting the notion that the 
law’s meaning is necessarily enmeshed in its context, that is, the interactions between 
social groups and the complex societal structures in which it is embedded.113 Moreo-
ver, as stated earlier, this is an analytical standpoint and not necessarily an assertion 
                                               
108 Tuori, supra note 105 at 7. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Bianchi, supra note 25 at 136. 
111 Though critical studies are common in discourse analysis, there is a variety of approaches. Phillips and Hardy propose 
two key dimensions to differentiate the different styles of research that deal with discourses. These two key dimensions 
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on the law’s nature. Thus in treating law as a discourse I still acknowledge the privi-
leged position of the law as a discourse that has the threat of force associated to its 
compliance. A consequence of this is that, even though any actor can freely produce 
this discourse, the effects of this production vary depending on the position of the 
actor.  
I would like to elaborate a little further upon the concrete decisions that these three 
interconnected aspects of the critical approach of this thesis have led me to take, as 
well as upon some of the challenges involved. The first aspect actually reflects an at-
titude towards research and to its expected outcomes. I have actively sought to high-
light the ways in which victims of mass atrocities can act in agentic ways because I 
believe this to be a question of justice. Indeed, as explained in the Preface of this 
summarising report, it was a sense of injustice which inspired this thesis in the first 
place,114 namely the idea that victims of mass atrocities were constantly invoked by 
others in the context of the ICC but were not given an opportunity to appear in per-
son. This positioning inspired me to choose cases in which victims’ political actions 
were apparent, at least at first sight.115 At times, my own positioning towards this issue 
was an important challenge as it unconsciously made me reflect upon the effects of 
the actions of victims in an overly positive way. In this, the role of my advisors, as well 
as the anonymous referees in the academic journals, were fundamental in making me 
confront my own arguments with the cases I was studying.  
The second aspect I described above involves an understanding of the law and its 
effects that is contrary to a traditional approach to the law. I believe that this under-
standing of the law is apparent in virtually all of the articles of this thesis because it is 
reflected in the way I analyse not only the cases, but also, the role of victims at the 
ICC. Understanding the questions of power that underlie the application of the law 
was a core question of this thesis, as was an understanding of how the law can serve 
                                               
114 In identifying this injustice and viewing it as a valid starting point for a doctoral research I am grateful to Martti 
Koskenniemi, who encouraged me to ‘keep the eyes on the ball’, the ball being the injustice as a core question in my 
doctoral research. 
115 In the next section, I will reflect about the choice of cases and how I interpret their meaning. 
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as a tool for oppressed groups. It is because of this, that the contexts and the effects 
of the legal materials are always highlighted in the different articles, as well as the 
meanings that victims’ groups created in utilising legal categories. 
 Finally, the third aspect of this critical approach entails focusing on a particular 
quality of the law (as a discourse) and allows us to see more concretely how the law 
connects with questions of power and exclusion. This was reflected mainly in the 
choice of materials for each article. Moreover, seeing the law as a discourse soon re-
veals one important feature: that the law relates to power not only in that it delineates 
frontiers of inclusion and exclusion, but also, in how access to the law is restricted. 
This, in itself, is a specific power resource that limits the ways in which lay actors, such 
as victims of mass atrocities, can also participate in the ways that law works as a dis-
course.116 This idea relates with the next important influence of the approach used in 
this thesis, namely the approach from below as a way to understand how victims of mass 
atrocities, as lay actors, also use the language of international law. 
Moreover, although the critical approach certainly influenced the other articles, this 
is more clearly seen in Article I, which evaluates how the representations of the victim 
in the context of the international criminal law — as highlighted by different critical 
scholars — may be reinforced by its absence.  This article has two main lines of inquiry 
that are initially treated separately. First, a philosophical inquiry into the question of 
political subjectivity following the works of Jacques Rancière which, together with the 
critical approach, served as a major theoretical background. In earlier versions of the 
paper, this philosophical part was the main question of the article. However, as a result 
of the publication process (and necessary revisions), a second line of inquiry was 
strengthened and became more important in the overall argument of the paper. This 
second line of inquiry relates to the question of victims’ participation in the ICC. In 
order to study this, I looked at primary and secondary sources, such as, the Court’s 
                                               
116 On the idea of power as control over access to specific sources of discourse, see Van Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Anal-
ysis’ in Deborah Tannen et al (eds) The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (2nd ed, John Wiley & Sons, 2015) 469 et seq.  
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statute and regulations regarding the question of victims’ participation, court’s deci-
sions, transcripts, as well as documents from the Assembly of States Parties, all re-
garding victims’ participation inside and outside the trials. This second line of inquiry 
allowed me to establish the virtual absence of possibilities of self-representation for 
victims of mass atrocities which contrasted with the discursive centrality of victims as 
legitimators of the international criminal enterprise. This became important because 
of the theoretical background, which allowed me to understand the importance of the 
possibility to appear, create a ‘theatrical space’ and disrupt and, in that process, be-
come a political subject. The absence of possibilities for self-expression, plus the ac-
cess obstacles that the international setting presents victims with, made it virtually 
impossible for victims to create that theatrical space. This was the basis for the main 
contention of the article: that more opportunities for self-representation should be 
provided to victims of mass atrocities at the ICC.  
An approach from below: Case studies in Articles II, III and IV 
As explained in section 3.2, after analysing the absence of actual victims in the 
context of the ICC, I became interested in studying the actions of victims of mass 
atrocities in using concepts of international law and the very category of victim. In 
doing this, I was influenced by works calling for a bottom-up approach, or an ap-
proach ‘from below’, to international law.117 This approach has at least two important 
meanings for my thesis: on the one hand, it explains the focus on domestic practices 
by non-institutional actors that use international law; on the other, it entails formulat-
ing the hypothesis that these practices may develop international law beyond its offi-
cial development. The underlying idea in this approach is that international law has 
been traditionally understood from an actor-based perspective that focuses on the 
actions in institutional places such as courts, international organisations, and in some 
                                               
117 Rajagopal, supra note 45; Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito supra note 42; a review of the perspective ‘from below’ can 
be found in McEvoy and McGregor, supra note 41, 2 et seq. 
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cases, NGOs.118 But this focus neglects non-institutional actors, such as social move-
ments that utilise the language of international law to frame their demands. Thus, an 
approach that looks at international law ‘from below’ requires taking seriously the us-
age that subaltern groups make of international law and the possibility that these us-
ages can influence the way international law may be understood (hence, ‘from below’).  
In adopting this approach, an important assumption of this thesis is that a better 
understanding of the variety and richness of actions in which victims of mass atrocities 
use the concepts of international law, and the category of victim itself, is relevant for 
international law and for international law institutions. More precisely, the call for in-
creasing victims’ self-representation at the international level in the context of the ICC, 
which was the main suggestion of Article I, is supported in this thesis by the close 
examination actions of victims’ actions domestically. In this sense, I embarked upon 
the study of such actions with the hypothesis that these would offer complex, varied 
and enriching uses of international law that should be taken seriously by international 
law as a field of practice and study. Moreover, I found that victims do not simply ‘use’ 
international law categories but infuse them with contents that sometimes allow them 
to question deeper injustices. 
It is because of this bottom-up approach that the thesis proceeds to study cases 
in Colombia. I chose cases in Colombia for different reasons, both substantive and 
more practical. First, Colombia is a country that endured a long-term internal conflict, 
with high amounts of victims, where transitional justice measures have been applied. 
Moreover, the close examination of the situation in Colombia, opened at the ICC, has 
implied that the ICC has substantively influenced the implementation of transitional 
justice measures in the country.119 This influence reflects in the way that the govern-
ment as treated the question of the victims, fully embracing the language of transitional 
justice, as well as the way in which victims themselves often refer to the ICC as a 
relevant actor in international law in questions regarding the internal armed conflict. 
                                               
118 Cf. Rajagopal, supra note 45 at 2.  
119 Easterday, supra note 21. 
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Second, in Colombia there are not only a vast number of victims, but victims who 
have gained political visibility, and are perceived by scholars as becoming an important 
political actor.120 This visibility is mainly due to the different ways in which victims 
have organised and mobilised around concepts of international law. As such, Colom-
bia seemed to provide several examples of victims of mass atrocities that could po-
tentially be used for my research. Third, there are practical reasons that made Colom-
bia attractive for me: I am a native Spanish speaker and, as I spent four months on a 
research visit to Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, I was well aware that the country 
has a well-developed academy, especially strong in the area of transitional justice and 
interdisciplinary studies. This meant that there were several cases of victims of mass 
atrocities that had been documented and studied from different disciplines. This was 
important as my articles have strongly relied on a variety of existing studies. 
Thus, Article II studies the case of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, 
the first case I decided to study. The reason for this, is that this is a case that had been 
studied from different perspectives and thus, there was abundant material that allowed 
me to become acquainted with the case without having to apply empirical methods. 
In order to approach this case, I first identified, selected, and studied research materi-
als describing the project of the Community. The article was largely based on the study 
and analysis of the contents of these secondary sources, as well as some primary 
sources available online.121 These contents were analysed considering the theoretical 
framework of Article I, the notion of political subjectivity of Jacques Rancière. This 
notion allowed me to assess the actions of the Community as non-compliant with the 
stereotypical image of the victim. In addition, I met with scholars, who had studied 
                                               
120  Angelika Rettberg, ‘Victims of the Colombian Armed Conflict: The Birth of a Political Actor.’ Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317270; Juan Pablo Vera Lugo, ’Transitional Justice, Memory, and the Emergence of 
Legal Subjectivities in Colombia’ in Sandra Brunnegger and Karen Faulk (eds) ’A Sense of Justice: Legal Knowledge and Lived 
Experience in Latin America’ (Stanford University Press, 2016); Mariana Delgado Barón, ‘Las Víctimas como sujetos po-
liticos en el proceso de justicia y pa zen Colombia: discursos imperantes y disruptivos en torno a la reconciliación, la 
verdad, la justicia y la reparación’ (Doctoral Thesis, Flacso México, 2011). 
121 It was only by the end of the writing process that I had the chance to visit briefly the Community. There, I had 
informal conversations with community leaders that, for the most part, confirmed my impressions about the project as 
one that is not merely defensive, but instead, it is largely about preserving a way of communal life. 
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the case of the Community, in order to have a better sense of their impressions and 
to address some questions about the Community.122 These conversations influenced 
the way I approached the case of the Community in that I was not only interested in 
the ways they approached legal institutions, but in how the Community shared values, 
identities and views of the world. Finally, as a result of the process of publication, the 
framework of legal pluralism became relevant and allowed me to assess the different 
legal frameworks interacting in the case of the Community.  
Article III, studies the case of Movice. I chose to study the workings of Movice 
because the group represented a totally different case from that of the Community.123 
While still in Colombia, I met with two members of Movice, and also with a legal 
scholar whose doctoral research had dealt with the earlier work of Movice, to infor-
mally discuss about the organisation.124 This allowed me to have a preliminary sense 
of what the organisation looked like and how I could examine its work in my thesis. 
When I began working on the article, I first identified several sources, including books 
published by Movice itself, and some secondary scholarly works reflecting on different 
aspects of its work. In addition, I also used primary sources retrieved from Movice’s 
website, especially Movice’s communiqués. However, unlike the case of Article II, 
there was not a lot of ethnographic material that I could rely on. I thus proceeded to 
collect online newspaper material that contained the word ‘Movice’ and gathered them 
in a file containing newspaper clips from 2008 until 2017. These clips were retrieved 
from newspapers and magazines with national (El Espectador and Semana) and regional 
(El Colombiano, El Heraldo) coverage, as well as virtual media (Silla Vacia, Colombia Plu-
ral). I then studied these clips. After studying this material however, I considered it 
was not sufficient so as to properly understand the work of Movice, particularly its 
most recent years. To address this challenge, I designed a semi-structured interview 
for Movice members aimed at ascertaining how they viewed the identity of the victim, 
                                               
122 I met with Juan Ricardo Aparicio, Gwen Burnyeat, Christopher Courtheyn, Laura Quintana and Pedro Valenzuela. 
123 See section 2.2, in which I reflect on these many differences. 
124 Gabriel Góme z Sánchez from Universidad de Antioquia; Alejandra Gaviria from Movice and Hijos e Hijas and other 
former members of Movice.                                                                                                                                     
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the differences of  Movice vis-à-vis other victims’ organisations in Colombia, Movice’s 
main achievements, the current political contexts and challenges to Movice’s work, 
and the impact of the peace agreement on Movice’s work. I travelled to Colombia to 
conduct interviews with Movice members, whom I contacted through one of the 
spokeswomen of the organisation that I knew because of her work on Movice as an 
academic. I conducted six interviews in total, all in Bogotá. Three of the interviewees 
held a special position in the organisation, two of them were spokesmen, and one was 
the contact person for the Bogotá chapter. The other three actively participated in 
Movice’s activities in the Bogotá chapter. The material obtained was transcribed onto 
paper and then analysed in order to identify recurring topics. The information ob-
tained through the interviews was used to complement the research already initiated. 
On the value of these cases — Movice and the Peace Community of San José de 
Apartadó — it is important to clarify that they do not attempt to serve as general 
examples. On the contrary, they are chosen on purpose, because they are the exception. 
As such, they merely attempt to present an exploration of the different ways in which 
victims use the category of victimhood and its effects. Indeed, I have chosen cases 
that appear to show victims acting in agentic ways, but my contention is not that vic-
tims of mass atrocities always act like this. Thus, my exploration attempts to decipher 
the logics of this exception, its possible effects and meaning in connection with its 
context.  
Article IV, in turn, presents a wider narrative of different attitudes of victims of 
mass atrocities that includes the cases studies in Articles II and III, as well as other 
cases. Here, I wanted to include not only cases of disruption, as in the previous articles, 
but also cases of victims that acted in a docile way, identifying with the category with-
out challenging it. In this, the work already done for previous articles was important 
for the reflections it had triggered on the limits of the use of the discourse of interna-
tional law. Moreover, there were a number of sources that I had identified and studied 
earlier in the process of preliminarily assessing the cases to study in the thesis, but that 
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I had not used because I had considered that they did not represent cases of disrup-
tion. These materials became the first materials of study for this article, as well as new 
material I identified for the purpose of this article. I divided the materials into two 
groups, those representing docile victims — that is, those victims whose actions did 
not problematise the category of victim’s underlying representations, according to the 
Rancièrian theoretical framework developed in Article I — and those representing 
challenging victims — that is, those who, in Rancière’s terms, become political sub-
jects with their actions. I also examined the different laws concerning the question of 
victimhood and examined them again with more attention on the question of the 
identity being constructed in each of them. 
Moreover, an aspect that is important about the way I approached the cases is the 
connection between theory and practice in the way the cases are defined. According 
to Ragin, the question of what a case is, finds different answers among researchers.125 
The cases in this thesis are viewed as ‘neither empirical nor given’ which means that, 
in approaching the cases, there is an interaction between ideas — i.e. the theoretical 
framework — and the evidence. This means that I attempted to discern the theoretical 
significance of the cases without necessarily determining their empirical limits.126 In 
practice, this allowed me to have a flexible approach to the cases which meant that 
both theory and case were constantly revisited as I developed the significance of the 
case. Thus, there was a dialogical process between the cases and its theoretical frame-
work, that I attempted to describe in section 2, as the study of the cases opened way 
to different theoretical frameworks that, in turn, allowed me to make sense of them. 
While I initiated my inquiry by viewing the first case of the Community through the 
framework of the political subject as developed by Jacques Rancière, studying the 
Community’s use of their unofficial law allowed me to see that these unofficial norms 
sheltered an alternative way of living that was critical to neoliberalism. It is because of 
this that the idea of the Community as subaltern began to take shape in the subtext of 
                                               
125 Charles Ragin, ‘What is a Case?’ in C. Ragin and C. Becker (eds.), What is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social 
Inquiry (1992), 7 et seq. 
126 Ibid, 10. 
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the article. Similarly, the question of how an identity of ‘the victim’ emerged both from 
the contentious actions and the docile actions of victims of mass atrocities was an idea 
that came from the study of the different cases in Article IV.127  
In studying cases of victims, an important concern is how my own act of portray-
ing their actions reflects my views and my own wish to assign a particular political 
significance to them. Just as in the reflections upon the critical approach of this thesis 
— which rejects the idea that my own positioning towards my research comes from a 
neutral place from which I then pick a method — also, in approaching cases of victims 
of mass atrocities, I reject the notion that I do that from an epistemologically neutral 
place, in which my words ‘do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of 
others.’128 In studying victims’ actions, I have to draw a representation that allows the 
reader of my articles to understand the way that I see them. As such, I am in a way, 
‘engaging in the act of representing the other’s needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who 
they are.’129 As Alcoff has highlighted, ‘this act of representation cannot be understood 
as founded on an act of discovery’ and, instead, it must be understood that I am ac-
tively producing that representation.130  
This has been a preoccupation in approaching the cases, as I have attempted to 
study them in a way that allows me to understand different views and different ways 
of interpreting the actions of victims. Moreover, I do not believe that this representa-
tion is needed for them to be seen in the domestic context, where victims of mass 
atrocities have been portrayed in different and, at times, conflicting ways as they are 
recognised as important political actors. Instead, I think that this representation is 
needed in the international context, where victims’ self-representation — especially in 
the context of venues such as the ICC — occurs rarely, if ever. In this sense, Alcoff 
concludes her illuminating article with the following thought:  
                                               
127 Other theoretical frameworks I resorted to in the articles were the sociology of social movements and legal pluralism. 
128 Linda Alcoff, ‘The Problem of Speaking for Others’ (1991-1992) 20 Cultural Critique 5, 20. 
129 Ibid, 9. 
130 Ibid. This is why Alcoff argues that speaking for others also includes representing that other. 
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‘The source of a claim or discursive practice in suspect motives or manoeuvres or in privileged 
social locations, I have argued, though it is always relevant, cannot be sufficient to repudiate it. We 
must ask further questions about its effects, questions that amount to the following: will it enable the 
empowerment of oppressed peoples?’131 
I do think that the aim of this thesis, in reflecting at an academic level upon vic-
tims’ representation as defenceless, and in contrasting it with victims’ political actions 
domestically, may contribute to victims’ empowerment. If anything, it aims at prob-
lematising their absence and lack of opportunities of self-representation at a venue 
such as the ICC. 
?  
                                               
131 Ibid, 29. 
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4. Victims of mass atrocities: political subjectivity, subalternity and identity 
As stated earlier in the introduction, my aim in this summarising report is to bridge 
the gap between the questions that emerged from the articles and the initial query, that 
is, victims of mass atrocities at the ICC. In what follows, I will do this by discussing 
different concepts that I used to analyse, or which emerged in the different articles, 
namely the concepts of political subjectivity, subalternity and identity. These three 
concepts reflect the ways in which I thought about victims’ cases in the different arti-
cles. As explained in the section on method, the case studies in this thesis were thought 
of as having a dialogical relation to theory. In concrete, this means that the concepts 
I develop here relate to the articles in two alternative ways, either as a concept that I 
approached the question with as part of the theoretical framework (Article I and con-
cept of political subjectivity); or as a concept that emerged from the articles (Articles 
II and III and the concept of subalternity, and Article IV and the concept of identity). 
In this sense, especially the concepts of subalternity and identity, in their connection 
with the category of victim, are both theoretical frameworks and findings of my re-
search. Thus, I believe that these concepts offer a key to understanding my thesis as 
they highlight the ways in which I looked at the actions of victims of mass atrocity in 
Colombia.  
Before I begin, let me briefly recap and explain how these concepts relate to the 
different articles. In Article I, I focused on the question of victims’ participation in the 
context of the ICC. Here, the concept of political subjectivity was central to the article 
as I explored how Jacques Rancière’s ideas on the political subject could allow me to 
rethink victims and their participation at the ICC. From here on, I studied the specific 
ways in which this political subjectivity could take shape in cases of victims’ groups in 
the specific context of Colombia. In Article II, I studied the case of the Community 
of San José de Apartadó. Here, legal pluralism was central as a way to see that certain 
practices of the Community could be seriously considered as forms of unofficial law. 
Here, an underlying idea that began to shape my thinking was that the practices of 
groups such as the Community could be considered what Santos and Rodríguez-
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Garavito call ‘subaltern cosmopolitan legality.’132 This concept encompasses a bot-
tom-up approach to the study of law in globalisation that focuses on case studies of 
counter-hegemonic legal forms. The aim of this approach is to achieve a conception 
of the legal field that is suitable for reconnecting law and politics and reimagining legal 
institutions from below.133 Thus the idea of victims as subalterns and how interna-
tional law could be used, modified, and even created from below was at the core of 
Article II, although it remained in the subtext. A similar idea also permeated Article 
III, in which, the limits of the law as a tool for political mobilisation became apparent 
to me. Finally, in Article IV, a core concept that emerged during the writing process 
was that of identity and how the disruptive actions of victims of mass atrocities, the 
docile actions of victims of mass atrocities, the actions or inactions of the government, 
all contributed to the formation of an identity of the victim of mass atrocity, which 
was always in dispute and never fully realised.134 
In this section, while connecting these concepts with the articles, I also reflect 
on why it is relevant to consider the victims in light of such ideas for the purposes of 
international law institutions, such as the ICC.  
Victims as political subjects 
The claim, advanced in Article I, that victims of mass atrocity can potentially be 
political subjects is only innovative in a context in which these individuals are usually 
portrayed as defenceless and passive. Saying that victims can be political subjects con-
tradicts such a portrayal. Becoming a political subject requires agency, action and the 
capacity to provoke disruption, characteristics that are in contradiction with the as-
sumed passiveness and defencelessness of victims. This contrast seems to be even 
sharper in the case of victims of mass atrocities because of the gravity of the violations 
these victims have suffered. Thus, in the articles of this thesis, I was interested first, 
                                               
132 Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César Rodríguez Garavito, ‘Law, Politics and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic 
Globalisation’ in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César Rodríguez Garavito (eds) Law and Globalisation from Below (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005) 
133 Ibid, 14-15. 
134 Hall, supra note 98. 
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in simply showing that there was a paradox in the idea of the victim of mass atrocity 
as a political subject. On the one hand, victims of mass atrocity have suffered from 
the worst kinds of violations of international law and this suffering is usually repre-
sented as accompanied by extreme need. Victims of mass atrocity, in this depiction, 
are not worried about political issues, they are worried about more pressing needs: 
Preserving their lives, fleeing from violence, finding food and shelter, recovering from 
injuries and trauma. On the other hand, there are others who can help them by bring-
ing justice and offering different forms of redress. Thus, victims do not need to worry 
about political questions, there are others who can do that for them, namely all the 
bureaucracy of human rights, international criminal law, and transitional justice. 
Yet, there is some truth in this depiction of victims of mass atrocity as individuals 
who are often in dire need, only concerned with securing their basic needs. Claiming 
that victims can be understood as political subjects does not imply completely refuting 
the partial accuracy of this stereotype. Indeed, Colombian victims of forced displace-
ment suffer a tragedy that largely corresponds to this representation.135 Paramilitaries 
often arrived to towns with lists of the people who supposedly supported or belonged 
to the guerrillas and killed them in particularly violent and public ways, as a warning 
to all the other people, often also giving them a deadline for leaving the towns.136 
Sometimes, towns were attacked later by guerrillas who also accused them of support-
ing the paramilitaries. As a response, people abandoned their homes taking with them 
only the essentials, which meant abandoning their basic source of income: The land 
on which they lived. In some cases, these victims had also lost a family member, hav-
ing had to flee from their homes in grief and poverty. When I met victims who par-
ticipated in Movice in Bogotá, some of them referred to this as obstacles to political 
                                               
135 Victims of forced displacement make for the overwhelming majority of victims. According to the Unified Registry 
of Victims, over seven million victims of the conflict in Colombia have suffered from forced displacement. 
136 Only in the region of Montes de María, between 1999 y 2001 there were 42 massacres with 354 casualties. A famously 
shocking massacre was the case of the town of El Salado, occurred in 2000, with 60 casualties. Here, paramilitaries forced 
inhabitants of the town of El Salado, to gather in the soccer court and, as they played music with percussion instruments 
taken of the House of Culture of the town, they killed several people that had been signalled as collaborators of the 
guerrilla. See: GMH, La Masacre de El Salado: Esa guerra no era nuestra (GMH, 2009) 9 and 35 et seq. 
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mobilisation: Some members simply did not have time to participate in the activities 
organised by Movice because they had more urgent needs.137 However, I also had the 
chance to meet others who would still participate in the activities in spite of the eco-
nomic difficulties they faced.138 
The problem with the stereotype of the victim of mass atrocity, then, is not its 
inaccuracy, but instead, that it prevents institutional actors that interact with these 
victims from seeing some of their actions as profoundly political and agentic. And this 
is important for an institution such as the ICC because the Court’s Statute includes 
measures for victims’ participation, but this participation is heavily influenced by the 
depiction of the victim as essentially passive and defenceless. Moreover, it seems that 
all the incentives are there to perpetuate this image: In their search for legitimacy, 
different actors of the Court often invoke the legitimating power of the victims’ suf-
fering and,139 in the meantime, the victims never appear directly before the judges, 
leaving their representation in the hands of actors whose work is legitimised through 
the idea that they are bringing justice to the defenceless victims. This is a vicious cycle 
in which, the victims’ absence allows others, whose work relies upon the assumption 
of victims’ passiveness, to speak for them. This cycle, in turn, can influence how vic-
tims are viewed by other institutional actors, such as, the Trust Fund for Victims, the 
main institution handling victim reparation at the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties 
of the ICC, or also, national institutions that aim at following international standards, 
such as the Victims Unit, in Colombia.  
Moreover, by showing the contradiction between the stereotype that victims of 
mass atrocities are often represented as essentially defenceless, docile and passive and 
their agentic behaviour, I do not necessarily mean to fully embrace the idea that the 
inclusion of the individual as a subject in international law is decidedly emancipa-
tory.140 Instead, by showing this contradiction I call for an analysis that considers the 
                                               
137 Lucía Osorno Ospina, Interview (11 April 2018). 
138 This was the case of Gloria Inés Alvarado Cárdenas and Blanca Nubia Diaz. 
139 See: Kendall and Nouwen, supra note 27; and Fletcher, supra note 27. 
140 This contention has been made, for instance, by: Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind 
Towards a New Jus Gentium (2nd Edition, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), 252. 
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context in which processes of political subjectivity take place, because it is in relation 
to this context that political subjectification actually occurs. This is why, in exploring 
the cases of victims, I sought to show that the depiction of the victim was inaccurate 
in representing victims whose actions could be understood as political. Legal ap-
proaches that study victims’ political actions tend to focus more on the actions of 
victims before official institutions such as courts or parliamentary discussions.141 In-
stead, because my approach was influenced by the idea of political subjectivity as de-
veloped by Jacques Rancière, I looked at other actions in which victims were able to 
disrupt the social space using concepts of international law. In this way, I show that 
the political actions of victims of mass atrocity can take different shapes and textures, 
the meanings of which depend on the context in which they occur. Some of these 
shapes were political rallies in which the category of victim is deployed to assert that 
a specific perpetrator is being excluded from the public discourse;142 safe areas, invok-
ing not only the category of victim, but also principles of international humanitarian 
law;143 photo galleries in public spaces showing victims engaging in politics;144 an un-
official Truth Commission telling stories of women not only being victimised but also 
showing their recovery;145 or the very formation of a nation-wide coalition of victims 
of a specific armed actor, in a specific national context.146 
Why, then, is it relevant to look at these actions? Rights, as inscriptions that define 
roles, hierarchies and procedures, necessarily define limits of inclusion and exclusion. 
Political actions are disruptive in the sense that they call into question the exclusions 
delineated by these rights, or by the assumptions upon which rights are interpreted, 
or by for the practices that those assumptions support. Naturally, this means that po-
litical actions can certainly be uncomfortable for the institutional actors, whose work 
is based on, and whose practice supports these assumptions. But an understanding of 
                                               
141 E.g. Sandoval Rojas, supra note 91; Gómez Sánchez, supra note 91. 
142 This is the case of Movice, described in Article III. 
143 This is the case of the Peace Community, descibed in Article II. 
144 This is the case of Hijos e Hijas, described in Article IV. 
145 This is the case of the Ruta Pacifica, described in Article IV. 
146 This is also the case of Movice, Article III. 
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the political as disruption assigns an important value to disruptive practices, as these 
are now up held as potentially enriching for the institutions. Indeed, the effect of the 
political action is that it forces institutions or communities to re-evaluate, to re-assess 
and perhaps modify practices and imaginaries that influence the way laws are under-
stood and applied. The strength of human rights, as a tool for political actions, lies 
precisely in this constant movement between their inscription and political dissensus.147 
Let us now return to the question, posed earlier in this section, of why it is im-
portant to think of victims as potential political subjects in the context of an institution 
such as the ICC. Thus far, I have suggested that the work of the ICC with regard to 
victims, can be seen as a cycle in which the victims’ absence reinforces the stereotype 
of the victim as defenceless. This happens in spite of the existing legal measures to 
ensure the participation of the victims because their representation as defenceless is 
part of an institutional practice of different actors within the Court (not only of those 
who directly represent them). In this context, victims’ disruptive political actions 
would allow an institution such as the ICC to, slowly and progressively, re-evaluate 
the underlying image of the victim. 
Finally, if one understands the political action as a disruptive action, it follows that 
the political cannot really be truly incorporated in the institutional realm. If it was, the 
political would lose the disruptive effect that characterises it and that provokes re-
evaluation and eventually institutional change in favour of the excluded. Because of 
this, in Article I, I suggested that victims of mass atrocities should have more oppor-
tunities for self-representation in different areas of the ICC’s institutional discussions, 
be they trials or policy discussions. It is true that the effect of this inclusion may be 
only marginal because, in the end, it is for the victims themselves to act disruptively. 
Thus, I am advocating for an opportunity for the political to occur. And this is neces-
sary because, unlike in the domestic context where — as shown in the articles of this 
                                               
147 Ari Hirvonen, ‘Fight for your rights: Refugees, resistance, and disagreement’, law’ in López Lerma, Mónica and Etx-
abe, Julen (eds), Rancière and Law (Taylor & Francis, 2017), 65. 
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thesis — the political can occur, an institution like the ICC is far too removed from 
the local communities directly affected by the crimes it deals with. 
Of course, for all of this to make sense, one has to first believe that incorporating 
a greater or more meaningful degree of participation for victims is a positive thing. 
Thus far, I have referred to the idea of victims as political subjects. In my view, this 
idea only allows us to understand two things: First, that there is value in seeing dis-
ruption as a political device because it allows us to appreciate the importance of prac-
tices that occur in the margins of the institutions in the re-assessment and, possibly, 
the transformation of institutions, institutional practices and the assumptions upon 
which those are based. Second, through disruptive action, victims of mass atrocities 
may be able to challenge institutions, institutional practices, and the related assump-
tions, including their institutional representations. But to evaluate that a greater inclu-
sion of the victims of mass atrocities in the ICC is a positive outcome, requires an 
additional step. Indeed, following Frost’s analysis of Rancière, both progressive and 
regressive arguments can be political if they challenge the distribution of the sensible, 
and ask for the given order to be redistributed in their favour.148 I believe that, in order 
to evaluate the greater inclusion of victims of mass atrocities within the ICC as a pos-
itive development, one must first acknowledge that there is an imbalance of power at 
the core of institutions such as the ICC, in which, oppressed groups are over repre-
sented on the side of the victims, while the elites are over represented among the 
different actors that compose the Court. Thus, the question of how the category of 
victim may be used to question this imbalance of power is a different concern that, in 
my view, relates to evaluating the potential of the category of victim for subaltern 
groups. 
Victims as subalterns 
The different articles of this thesis show that the concerns that victims of mass 
atrocities voice in the discussions in which they intervene through political disruption 
                                               
148 Tom Frost, ‘Rancière, human rights, politics of process’ in in López Lerma, Mónica and Etxabe, Julen (eds), Rancière 
and Law (Taylor & Francis, 2017). 
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can be deeper than the mere affirmation of victims’ rights as a legal matter. For exam-
ple, they can express deep criticism of the exclusion of narratives of female victims of 
the conflict;149 of the official story of a 50-year internal conflict and its causes;150 of 
the way that victims are usually portrayed in transitional justice measures;151 or of the 
neoliberal system.152 All these criticisms show structural injustices that may remain 
unaddressed despite the application of transitional justice measures. A particular ques-
tion that I explored in this thesis, therefore, is how victims of mass atrocities in Co-
lombia, a country in which the ICC has opened an investigation, have actually used 
the language of international law, including the category of victim, to support these 
various claims.  
As Reyes Posada has contended, the struggle to dispossess peasants (including 
indigenous and ethnic peasant communities) of their lands and their resources in fa-
vour of great land-owners, is at the heart of Colombian violence.153 In this context, 
one may wonder how this language works for the purposes of the victims considering 
that many of them belong to groups that can be considered as subaltern. Following 
Otto, I use the term ‘subaltern’ loosely to identify groups that are in positions of sub-
ordination that make them opposite to dominant or hegemonic groups. This position 
of subordination is determined with accordance to varying systems of hierarchising 
difference into relations of domination and subordination, i.e. social class, gender, re-
ligion, age, ethnicity.154 Systems of hierarchising difference are deeply connected to 
the specific contexts in which they take place. Because of this, viewing victims as sub-
alterns, necessarily entails looking at the specific contexts in which victimisation oc-
curs. Thus, this concept remained in the subtext in the articles, implicit in the notion 
                                               
149 As shown in Article IV with the case of the Ruta Pacífica.  
150 As shown in Article III about Movice. 
151 As shown in Article IV with the case of Hijos e Hijas. 
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153 Alejandro Reyes Posada, Guerreros y Campesinos. Despojo y restitución de tierras en Colombia (2nd Ed., Editorial 
Planeta, 2009), 50. 
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that, in the universe of victims of mass atrocities in Colombia, ethnic and racial mi-
norities, as well as, poor socio-economic classes, are grossly overrepresented.155  
The territorial dimension of the Colombian conflict is crucial to understand these 
questions. The appropriation of lands and resources is at the core of the Colombian 
armed conflict. This aspect, moreover, has prompted scholars to explore how transi-
tional justice measures can respond to structural questions related to land through 
public policy and normative regulation.156 However, here, the question I am asking is 
different because it does not relate to the specific measures that transitional justice, 
human rights or international criminal law can deliver to address the question of land. 
Instead, the question of land dispossession in Colombia relates to deeper injustices 
that explain how subaltern groups are epistemologically excluded from the public 
sphere and how the language of international law can allow them to access public 
discussions and influence these public discourses. 
Now, in Rancière’s account, all political practices are emancipatory.157 Certainly, if 
we understand a political practice as one that enables us to reassess exclusion, there is 
certainly an emancipatory potential for excluded subjects. Moreover, for Rancière, the 
subject of human rights is the one who makes something of the inscription of equality 
contained in it.158 In this sense, human rights are a tool for political action in the sense 
that they provide a declaration of equality against which the political actor can demon-
strate its exclusion. In this context, the language of rights can certainly serve as a tool. 
But this account does not consider how the hegemonic nature of human rights, and 
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cía Arboleda, El Lugar de las Víctimas en Colombia (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2013), 52 et seq; similarly, the Histor-
ical Memory Group, in its seminal report ‘Basta Ya!’ has contended that the Colombian conflict especially falls upon 
poor communities, afro-Colombian and indigenous peoples, dissidents and opposition and particularly affects women 
and children. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (CNMH), Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad (Im-
prenta Nacional, 2013), 25. 
156 For instance, Nelson Camilo Sánchez León, Tierra en transición: justicia transicional, restitución de tierras y política agraria en 
Colombia (DeJusticia, 2017). 
157 But what counts as political is very specific in Rancière. As explained in Article I, equality in Rancière is presupposed, 
not given or achieved. Political actors do not demand equality, they act as already equal, and in doing so, they become 
political subjects. It is this equality, which produces emancipation. See: Todd May, ‘Wrong, Disagreement, Subjectifica-
tion’ in J. Deranty (ed.), Jacques Rancière: Key Concepts (Routledge, 2010), 72-73.  
158  Jacques Ranciére, ’Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’ (2004) 103 South Atlantic Quarterly 297. 
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their distinctively Western origin, may also play a role in silencing the voices of subal-
tern groups. This is what I want to discuss in this section. 
Post-colonial scholars have shown that many institutions of international law that 
today are considered as ‘neutral,’ have in fact a colonial origin and served to legitimise 
the colonial enterprise.159 Moreover, as argued by Angie, the use of international law 
to further imperial policies is a feature of the discipline that persists until today as, in 
its civilising mission, it seeks to transform the internal characteristics of diverse socie-
ties.160 In this context, the UN Charter, often viewed as the seminal development for 
the different areas that take interest in victims of mass atrocities — ICL, IHRL, tran-
sitional justice—, actually reflects the European history of the evolution of the inter-
national community, despite its purported universality.161 Thus, as Santos has sug-
gested, human rights are universal only when they are viewed from a Western stand-
point, because they rest on a set of presuppositions that are distinctly Western.162 In-
ternational law is a powerful forum in which dominant narratives of social reality are 
produced and reproduced as not only normative but also as universal. The result is 
that alternative discourses are silenced.163  
In this landscape, a question I seek to explore here is what degree of emancipation 
can there be in using a device that also sustains hegemonic power? This is precisely 
the kind of question that subaltern and post-colonial studies pose and it represents a 
different perspective from the one explored through the concept of the political sub-
ject. Indeed, a question common to these approaches is whether international law can 
be used to advance the interests of subalterns.164 Or, as Spivak famously asked, ‘Can 
                                               
159 See for instance, Anthonie Angie, ‘The Evolution of International Law: colonial and postcolonial realities’ (2006) 27 
Third World Quarterly 739. 
160 Id. 751. 
161 Otto, supra note 154 at 339. 
162 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (2nd ed, 2002, Cambridge University Press), 269 and 
270. Some of these presuppositions are, that there is a universal human nature that can be known by rational means; 
that human nature is essentially different from and higher than the rest of reality; that the individual has an absolute and 
irreducible dignity that must be defended against society or the state; that the autonomy of the individual requires that 
society be organised in a non-hierarchical way, as sum of free individuals. 
163 Cf. Carol smart (1989) cited in Otto, supra note 154 at 351. 
164 Ibid, 338, Otto asks ‘whether it is possible to imagine processes whereby non-dominant, non-elite, subaltern individuals 
and groupings could participate as subjects of international law.’ Similarly, Angie: ‘The questions that then arise are 
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the subaltern speak?’165 This entails looking at the limits of international law as a device 
for political mobilisation that is in itself built around concepts that are distinctively 
Western. In this sense, Spivak’s answer is that the subaltern does not really have a 
possibility to speak through ‘the epistemic violence of imperialist law and educa-
tion.’166 She contends that this is so because — in ideological and scientific production 
as well as in the institution of law — great care has been taken to obliterate the textual 
ingredients with which the subaltern subject could express her own self. 167  I 
acknowledge that the possibilities of subalterns as subjects to express their way of 
viewing the world are uncertain as these may simply not be intelligible when expressed 
through the language of international law. But, as Otto explains, this does not mean 
that they are unable to talk but, rather, that they are not admissible in their own 
terms.168 In this sense, the language of international law is one of those few forms of 
resistance that has been granted legitimacy.169 It is important not to understand re-
sistance as mere opposition, instead, forms of resistance that can be successful are 
those that transform the dominant discourse so as to establish cultural difference 
within that dominant discourse.170 Thus, for Said, the partial tragedy of resistance is 
that it must, to a certain degree, work to recover forms already established, influenced 
or infiltrated by the dominant culture.171 
This means that, subalterns are admissible in the terms provided by the discourse 
of human rights, one of them being precisely the category of victim of mass atrocity. 
In exploring the cases of victims of mass atrocities using the category of the victim, 
                                               
whether, how and to what extent international law can be used for the purposes of furthering the interests of Third 
World peoples—protecting them against the excesses of the authoritarian and sometimes genocidal state, on the one 
hand, and advancing their interests in the international sphere on the other.’ Angie, supra note 159 at 752; also, Santos, 
supra note 162 at 439 et seq, where he dedicates the final chapter of his book to the question ‘Can law be emancipatory?’ 
165 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds) Colonial discourse 
and post-colonial theory, a reader (Columbia University Press, ) 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid, 75. 
168 Otto, supra note 154 at 354. 
169 Rajagopal, supra note 45154 at 9. Here, I use the word resistance as developed by postcolonial studies. Even though 
resistance movements arouse against European empires demanding for independence, postcolonial studies concentrate 
in more subtle forms of cultural resistance. Bill Ashcroft et al, Post-Colonial Studies: the Key Concepts (Routledge, 2013) 229. 
170 Bill Ashcroft and Ahluwalia Pal, Edward Said (Routledge, 2008) 104. 
171 Edward Said, cited in Bill Ashcroft and Ahluwalia Pal, Edward Said (Routledge, 2008) 105. 
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what I found is that this category provides a platform from which subalterns can com-
municate with the institutions that incorporate the language of international law in the 
domestic context. Thus, if victims of mass atrocities are understood as subalterns, the 
category of victim may sometimes work as a vehicle — a sort of ‘Trojan horse’ — grant-
ing legitimacy to their claim and allowing them to question deeper injustices. At the 
same time, the category of victim can serve to challenge from within the assumptions 
on which the category itself is based. I believe that, especially in cases such as the 
community of San José de Apartadó, the language of international law provides an 
intelligible device through which a Community, otherwise silenced, can address offi-
cial institutions. Not only can they address them, but also, influence the potential re-
assessment and modification of exclusionary institutions, institutional practices, and 
the assumptions underlying these two.  
To be sure, I am not claiming that this is the only or the best vehicle to introduce 
such concerns. One thing that comes out as a conclusion after studying cases of vic-
tims of mass atrocities using the category of victim, is that its reach is actually limited. 
This is my conclusion in Articles III and IV. While the indeterminacy of the interna-
tional norm is a feature that allows victims to appropriate it, and give it a specific 
content to support their demands of justice, it is also a feature that allows others to 
appropriate it. Moreover, it is a feature that allows the government to comply with the 
international standards — often formulated in broad terms — without addressing the 
deeper demands of the victims. Thus, while appreciating the possibilities of the lan-
guage of rights in terms of its potential reach that go beyond the level of the strictly 
legal, at the same time, one must appreciate the limitations inherent in political de-
mands that are based on the language of rights. Basically, a demand using the language 
of rights seeks a normative response — regardless of the other effects it may have — 
that can be addressed by the institutions only in the language of rights without chang-
ing other relevant institutional elements that create exclusion.  
Furthermore, as much as I believe that the category of victim has (limited) poten-
tial as a tool for political mobilisation of victims’ group in the domestic context, I am 
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not so optimistic about its reach in the international context. And this relates to my 
initial concern in this thesis, namely participation of victims at the ICC. As I suggested 
in Article I, the context of international institutions, such as the ICC, poses a number 
of barriers that hinder victims’ direct interaction in a way that allows them to provoke 
disruption. My idea in that article was that if the inclusion of victims as participants in 
the procedure before the ICC is based on the assumption that this participation is a 
matter of justice, the least they could do was to allow for victims to appear in person. 
Only this could ensure that the Court incorporates, at least, the possibility of disrup-
tion. 
However, as much as I would like to remain hopeful of the possibility of victims 
appearing in person before the court, I do not think that such a measure is able to 
really bridge the epistemological gap between elites — often over represented in insti-
tutions such as the ICC — and subalterns — often over represented on the side of 
the victims. To do this, a more radical approach may be needed as, among other 
things, international institutions such as the ICC represent, not only a particular — 
western — way of conflict resolution, but also, a particular — western — way of 
evaluating which grievances are considered severe enough so that their prosecution is 
of the interest of the ‘international community.’ 
The disputed identity of the victim of mass atrocity 
Another way of understanding the different uses of the category of victim that 
victims themselves do, is to see them as contributing to the formation of an identity 
that is always disputed. This is what the exploration in Article IV led me to conclude. 
Here, I decided to look not only at those cases that I identified as political, but also 
those other cases in which the victims would, in fact, correspond more to the stereo-
typical image of the victim as disempowered and defenceless. Appreciating the dimen-
sion of identity allowed me to explore how the interaction of the institutional and the 
disruptive — the political and the police, in Rancière's account — could unfold. Surely, 
my exploration is only superficial, as such a project would deserve a much greater 
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degree of depth. But, my intention was not really to embark on such a project for its 
own sake. Instead, my intention was only to contrast the actions that supported the 
stereotype of the passive victim with what I had previously studied about victims of 
mass atrocities’ use of international law categories for political mobilisation. In other 
words, since my research of the cases of victims of mass atrocity in Colombia had, 
until that point, been more focused on the side of the political/disruptive, I zoomed 
out in order to appreciate also the side of their actions at the domestic level that was 
not disruptive but, instead, complying with the institutional. This allowed me to con-
clude that a better way to describe the victim’s identity was to see it as constantly 
disputed. 
That the category of victim is disputed means that there are different practices 
that pull in different directions, thus contributing to different ways of representing the 
victim of mass atrocities. On the one hand, institutional practices tend to reaffirm the 
stereotype precisely because this representation justifies the institutional intervention 
in the first place. Here, both victims who seek for some forms of redress as well as 
the government officials contribute to pulling in a similar direction. Moreover, other 
actors who I suspect contribute to this may be international NGOs working in Co-
lombia.172 Victims who go to governmental offices and ask for these institutional in-
terventions, are more often than not, in acute need. In this, they certainly comply with 
the stereotype of the victim as defenceless.173 
On the other hand, disruptive practices tend to challenge the representation of the 
victim as defenceless and passive. The cases of Movice and the Peace Community are 
examples of organised groups of victims that use the language of international law to 
frame their demands of justice. But their demands of justice have deeper meanings 
that are connected with their projects as organisations. A collateral effect of these 
actions is that victims represent themselves an identity that is in contradiction with the 
                                               
172 Although I did not focus my attention on these actors in the articles. 
173 It is important to make explicit that in this analysis I do not mean to essentialise the victims as many different char-
acteristics may coexist in the same individual. An individual victim who seeks redress before the state may also be part 
of a contentious group and with those actions also support another stereotype of the victim. 
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assumed passivity of the victim. Thus, the identity of the victim in Colombia is the 
one that comes out of the interplay between the different practices that use the cate-
gory victim and represent the victim in different ways. It is because of the actions of 
victims’ groups such as Movice, the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, the 
Ruta Pacífica and Hijos e Hijas, that today in Colombia, it is now a common place to say 
that victims of the conflict are important political actors.174 
Furthermore, in studying the case of Colombia, I realised that many of the insti-
tutional responses to victims of mass atrocity also ended up reinforcing this identity 
because, in dealing with victims in need, they simply failed to deliver what they had 
promised. In the article, I examined two specific ‘promises’ that failed in their imple-
mentation, namely the promise of reparations to victims and the promise of victims’ 
participation.  
Admittedly, administrative reparations programs for the benefit of the victims face 
important challenges because, unlike individual reparations established by courts, they 
are meant to address massive numbers of victims. In Colombia, the Unified Registry 
of Victims currently counts a total of more than eight million victims of the conflict, 
who are included in it for the purposes of reparations.175 The challenges to this kind 
of administrative program are so significant that they have prompted renowned ex-
perts, such as Pablo de Greiff — the former Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence — to suggest that a differ-
ent conception of justice should serve as basis for these reparations efforts.176 Instead 
of following the classic principle of restitutio in integrum,177 for this author, reparations 
for the purposes of mass reparations programs should be considered as part of a wider 
                                               
174 Rettberg, supra note 120; Vera Lugo, supra note 120; Delgado Barón, supra note 120; Cinep, El Reto de las Víctimas: El 
Reconocimiento de sus Derechos, (Cinep, 2009). 
175 See the Unified Registry for Victims (Registro Único de Víctimas) https://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV. 
176 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations’ in Pablo de Greiff (ed.) The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford University 
Press), 451. 
177 According to this principle, ‘reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.’ Permanent 
Court of International Justice, Factory at Chorzów, Germany v Poland, Judgment, Claim for Indemnity, Merits, Judg-
ment No 13, (1928) PCIJ Series A No 17, ICGJ 255 (PCIJ 1928), (13th September 1928). 
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political program aimed at the ‘reconstitution or the constitution of a new political 
community.’178 As such, reparations in transitional contexts should have less strict re-
quirements than in the traditional approach. 
However, regardless of the conception of justice and the — more or less strict — 
requirements of reparations, a failure to deliver reparations has effects that must be 
considered. As noted by Ottendoerfer, the fact that international norms of transitional 
justice must be differentiated from the design of an instrument as well as from its 
implementation has often been ignored in the literature. For this author, in reparations 
programs, ‘implementation ultimately decides about the experiences people make with 
the program, and this in turn lays the basis for many effects to unfold’.179 With regard 
to implementation in Colombia, in his ethnography of Wayuu indigenous victims of 
mass atrocities in Colombia, Jaramillo has described how lack of implementation of 
reparative measures affects the groups that are entitled to them. This author has sug-
gested that a fundamental question is that, in recognising that a particular victim is 
entitled to reparations, the government acknowledges the debt it owes to that victim. 
But, unlike other creditor-debtor relations, in which the recognition of a debt sets a 
certain hierarchy between the creditor — the victim — and the debtor — the state, 
the fact that the latter can keep, and actually keeps victims waiting, reverts this rela-
tion.180 Thus, when the official acknowledgment of the debt is followed by sustained 
and lengthy wait, the government’s inaction not only strengthens its sovereignty, but 
also, maintains the victims — most already in a vulnerable position — in a state of 
need and suspense, thus reinforcing the stereotype of the victim as defenceless and 
passive.     
                                               
178 De Greiff, supra note 176 at 454-5. For De Greiff, there are two fundamental reasons that justify this: First, ‘all legal 
systems work on the assumption that norm‐breaking behaviour is more or less exceptional. But this is not the case when 
programs of reparations are being designed, for such programs attempt to respond to violations that, far from being 
infrequent and exceptional, are massive and systematic.’ Second, to assume a political perspective on reparations opens 
up the possibility of pursuing broader ends, some of which related to a ‘broad conception of justice that goes beyond 
the satisfaction of individual claims, and that involves recognition, civic trust, and social solidarity.’  
179 Eva Ottendoerfer, ‘Translating Victims' "Right to Reparations" Into Practice: A Framework for Assessing the Imple-
mentation of Reparations Programs From a Bottom-Up Perspective’ (2018) 40 Human Rights Quarterly 905, 910. 
180 Jaramillo, supra note 96 at 41 and 55. 
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Moreover, with regards to the ‘promise’ of participation. Even in these cases 
where victims were allocated a place to participate in different administrative or judi-
cial contexts, it seems that it would only reinforce victims’ representation as defence-
less. Indeed, I studied how in the different consecutive legal frameworks, victims’ par-
ticipation was often more limiting than enabling and often used to legitimise the gov-
ernment’s transitional justice policies. Especially in the context of the late Victims’ 
Law, it seems that this is because victims’ participation was not allocated enough in-
stitutional and financial support. But, even though this, as in the case of reparations, 
is due to practical restraints, rather than explicit political decisions, the effect is that it 
reinforces a particular stereotype. 
In turn, disruptive practices of victims may focus on different questions. In the 
article, I only examined four groups and their disruptive practices, two of them had 
already been studied in depth in the previous articles (the Peace Community and Mov-
ice) and the other two were new. These actions have sometimes allowed for a recon-
sideration of the legal responses to the needs of victims of the conflict. For instance, 
by pushing for the inclusion of considerations of gender that acknowledge the differ-
ent ways in which the conflict affects women, or the removal of the reference to the 
perpetrator in a way that excludes victims of state crimes from being considered as 
beneficiaries of certain measures. 
Thus, there are substantive effects following from their actions that can be ob-
served, sometimes, in changes in the legal responses to victims of mass atrocities.181 
But, aside from the possible effect of disruptive practices in the modification of legal 
responses to victimisation, a question that is particularly relevant for an international 
venue such as the ICC is how all these actions challenge the representation of the 
victims as disempowered. What is more, in using the category of victim, the subaltern 
can contribute to the formation of its own disputed identity as, for instance, indige-
nous, black, maroon, peasant, poor, women, or any other. This is a form of cultural 
                                               
181 However, because of the multiplicity of factors that interplay, it is impossible to establish a causal relation between 
social movements and the outcomes they produce. See: Tarrow, supra note 93, 216. 
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resistance that relates to the construction of an abstract identity of the victim. This 
abstract identity is crucial because the decisions that legal operators make are neces-
sarily based on the shared assumptions about the individuals who are victims. Disrup-
tive practices of victims then, are not only relevant in that they may allow for a reas-
sessment of the strictly legal, but also, because they allow for a reassessment of the 
assumptions that sustain institutional practices. And one of these assumptions is the 
identity of the victim. That the identity of the victim is disputed in Colombia, is due 
to the actions of victims themselves who are present in the different debates that con-
cern them, regardless of being given an institutional seat in these debates or not. They 
can disrupt because they are in the same country, speak the same language, and are 
able to organise themselves around the category of victim. I believe that the value of 
victims’ self-representation is that they may contribute to the construction of their 
own identity. And this is an important basis for advocating for more spaces for self-
representation in the context of international institutions such as the ICC. 
?  
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5. Conclusion: Can the category of victim of international law be emancipatory?182 
Main findings 
As explained in this summarising report, this research began with a critical appraisal 
of the category of victim as one that is often invoked by others to legitimise their 
intervention. In this light, international criminal law is often described as aimed at 
prosecuting and judging individual perpetrators of mass atrocities,183 all within the 
larger objective of bringing justice to the victims of these crimes.184 Thus, institutions 
such as the ICC and its various operators, often present their work as one done for 
the nameless victims, constructing the latter as a subject who is defenceless, passive, 
docile, and in need for external support.  
This representation, I suggested, is accurate in describing the situation of several 
victims of mass atrocities who have suffered the worst kinds of human rights viola-
tions. However, it fails to represent the agentic actions of victims of mass atrocities 
who use the language of international law to frame their various demands for justice. 
But the problem with this representation is not only its accuracy because, as suggested 
in Article I, the main question is how this representation prevents the various opera-
tors of international law institutions, such as the ICC, from identifying and nurturing 
those actions and from evaluating their rich contributions. Moreover, the stereotypical 
image of the victim as passive and defenceless is also the representation upon which 
operators of the ICC base their interpretations of various provisions in the Court’s 
framework that concern the victims of the crimes. In this context, one of the contri-
butions of the victim’s agentic actions — that are obscured by their stereotypical image 
                                               
182 Here, I am paraphrasing Santos who asked, “Can law be emancipatory?” Santos, supra note 162 at 439 et seq. 
183 According to McCarthy, the idea that international criminal proceeding are, and should be, focused upon the punish-
ment of individual perpetrators has been prevalent in international criminal law since its inception, but the framework 
crated by the ICC supplemented this traditional approach by providing two distinctive forms of victim redress, namely 
reparations and support. Conor McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 34. 
184 Consider, for instance, the statement of the prosecutor cited earlier in the Preface: ‘My mandate is justice, justice for 
the victims.’ https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=press%20release%20media%20advi-
sory_%20icc%20prosecutor%20visits%20egypt%20and%20saudi%20arabia  and http://www.lse.ac.uk/human-
Rights/events/ICC.aspx. A description of different moments in which victims are invoked as justifiers of the interna-
tional criminal enterprise can be found in: Fletcher, supra note 27. 
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— is precisely that, with their actions, victims can influence the way in which their 
identity is constructed, and thus, indirectly influence the way in which legal provisions 
regarding victims are interpreted.  
In order to understand the different ways in which victims of mass atrocities use 
international law categories, this thesis has sought to connect the international with 
the domestic by examining how groups of victims of mass atrocities in Colombia use 
the category of victim. In other words, I sought to understand what these groups 
actually do with this language. The three concepts examined in the preceding section 
reflected some of the different perspectives through which I viewed this usage and 
interpreted its effects in the articles that make up this thesis. One of them, served as 
the theoretical framework through which I approached the articles, i.e. the concept of 
political subjectivity; the other two, emerged from the articles as I sought to make 
sense of what I had learned about the cases I studied. Thus, if victims of mass atroci-
ties are considered through the idea of political subjectivity, one can see how the use of 
the legal concept of victim in a way that challenges the prevailing representation of 
the victim is already a form of subjectification regardless of the specificity of the vic-
tims’ demands. If the victims of mass atrocities are, in turn, considered through the 
prism of subalternity, one can see that the category of victim is part of a hegemonic 
discourse of emancipation, and that, in infusing it with specific contents, the victims 
can communicate demands that may not find other specific articulation in the language 
of rights. Although taking a closer look at the specific ways in which this language is 
used allows to appreciate better the possibilities of this language for subaltern groups, 
there will always be parts that will remain unarticulated and this is a limitation of such 
language. Finally, through the idea of an identity that is never fully realised and always 
unfinished, I have shown that the actions of victims in using international law catego-
ries contribute to the dynamic construction of this identity by representing themselves 
as politically engaged agents and thus countering the notion that the victim is irreduc-
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ibly defenceless. In this way, victims resistance is not only the opposition to a partic-
ular norm of domestic law by invoking international law, but more importantly, the 
subtle transformation of the stereotype of the victim through their own actions. 
Aside from this analysis, the main findings of this thesis are: 
- There cannot be a fully theoretical discourse that explains the effects of a legal 
category such as the category of victim. Looking at the contexts and the actors 
that use this category is essential in understanding the meanings that are pro-
duced through its use.  
- In using the category of victim and explicitly referring to international law, vic-
tims are not simply adopting this language, they are infusing it with meanings 
that are often related to their own particular struggles. In this sense, the use is 
strategic. 
- The use of legal categories by victims of mass atrocities does not only produce 
instrumental effects, such as, the inclusion of a specific group of victims within 
the domestic legal definition of the victim (as in the case of Movice’s demands). 
Instead, its effects can also be expressive to the extent that they may legitimate 
alternative values, norms, lifestyles or validate the perspectives and identities of 
those groups that use them.185 These expressive effects are sometimes actively 
sought by groups themselves, such as in the case of Hijos e Hijas, described in 
Article IV, although it seems to me that, they are more often a by-product that 
movements do not actively seek. My impression is that groups such as Movice 
are not actively seeking this cultural change, but instead, actively seeking nor-
mative modifications.186 
These results are relevant for various reasons. Firstly, the idea that victims do not 
simply adopt the language of international law and that they infuse meanings to it, 
                                               
185 Neil Stammers, ‘Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 
980, 988. 
186 This is a question that could be object of further inquiry. 
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means that their uses may, sometimes, contribute to the development of international 
law. This is an important finding of the case of the Peace Community of San José de 
Apartadó and its development of bottom up safe areas, which has been later recog-
nised by the Colombian Constitutional Court and by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. Secondly, the expressive effect of the use of the language of rights, 
and the category of victim, is particularly crucial for a reflection on the importance of 
victims of mass atrocities’ self-representation in the context of international institu-
tions, such as the ICC: If victims are afforded these spaces of self-representation they 
have a chance to contribute to the creation of their own identity, thus validating their 
own perspectives and identities. Finally, the expressive effect of the use of the lan-
guage of rights is particularly relevant for the victims of mass atrocities, a subject that 
is usually represented as essentially defenceless. This representation justifies the inter-
vention of others actors who, in turn, reproduce this imagery. The actual presence of 
victims may allow them to resist the stereotype and possibly to transform it from 
within. 
Reflections on the emancipatory possibilities of the category of victim 
In all the different perspectives through which I examined the question of victims 
of mass atrocities, an underlying assumption is that the victims’ actions may actually 
change established practices that affect them, both domestically and internationally. 
This potential for change has remained in the subtext of this thesis, as an underlying 
assumption which has been, thus far, discussed only with regard to the emancipatory 
potential of the category of victim.187 In what follows, I develop my ideas regarding 
the emancipatory possibilities of the category of victim. 
                                               
187 Another connected concept is the concept of resistance. This is a concept that I only discussed briefly in this sum-
marising text. As explained above, the idea of resistance does not necessarily restrict to mere opposition but to the 
possibility of destabilising the meanings that the dominant power grants to certain words and institutions. To do this, 
the resistant party must utilise the words or frameworks of the dominant power and re-signify them to include cultural 
difference. As a cultural expression, the legal categories can be resisted and re-signified, this is actually my point later on 
in this conclusion. The connection between emancipation and resistance is that the first may be understood to include 
a greater degree of liberation, while the second is always necessarily confined to working with forms that have already 
been established by the dominant culture. Ashcroft and Pal, supra note 170 at 105. I thank the preliminary examiner 
Kieran McEvoy for his comment on the importance of discussing the question of resistance in connection with the idea 
of emancipation discussed here. 
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The idea that the discourse of human rights — a discourse in which the category 
of victim plays a central role — offers the possibility for emancipation, is actually one 
of the main assumptions of the ‘traditional’ approach to international law. For in-
stance, Cançado Trindade, contends that the inclusion of the individual person in in-
ternational law, through human rights and the institution of the right to petition, al-
lows for ‘the emancipation of the human being vis-à-vis his own State for the protection 
of his rights in the ambit of International Law of Human Rights.’188 Conversely, dif-
ferent critics have expressed scepticism towards this assumed emancipation of the 
discourse of human rights. In this, the centrality of the victim plays an important role 
because the subject that is constructed in this discourse is precisely one that is defined 
by its suffering. Thus, as I stated in Article I, while the discourse of human rights 
appears neutral, it actually constructs the notion of a disempowered individual, one 
that suffers and is in need of others’ assistance. For instance, Urueña contends that, 
while on paper, human rights appear as emancipatory, this emancipation is not really 
inspired by a thriving human spirit but instead results in the empowerment of bureau-
cracies and the consequent disempowerment of individuals.189 Another criticism is 
that currently human rights discourse occupies the field of emancipatory possibility, 
implicitly or explicitly delegitimising other emancipatory strategies.190  
In this thesis I began by problematising these criticisms, suggesting that, although 
they described some of the effects of the discourse of international law regarding the 
victim, they did not account for the way in which international law could serve as an 
important tool for grassroots organisations.191 Yet, problematising these arguments 
neither entails embracing their opposite nor to suggest that there is such a thing as a 
uniform opposite position. Instead, it puts both sides into question. Indeed, perhaps the 
                                               
188 Cançado Trindade supra note 140 at 252. 
189 Urueña, supra note 32 at 93. 
190 David Kennedy, ‘International Human Rights Movement: Part of the problem?’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 101, 108. 
191 This has been acknowledged by some of the critics of human rights. For instance, Koskenniemi contends that inter-
national law does serve to ‘give voice to those who have been excluded from decision-making positions and are regularly 
treated as objects of other peoples’ policies’ by providing a platform through which ‘claims about violence, injustice, and 
social deprivation may be made even against the dominant elements.’  Koskenniemi, supra note 33 at 110. 
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main assertion of this thesis is that it is impossible to determine a priori a specific effect 
of the discourse of international law regarding the victim. In other words, it is not 
possible to definitely proclaim that the discourse of the victim of mass atrocities in 
international law is definitely empowering or disempowering without understanding 
the contexts in which the category is wielded, its actors, and the meanings that they 
produce in wielding it. 
Furthermore, even though the way in which I posed the question in the title of 
this concluding section suggests that there may be a specific quality of the law that 
would make it emancipatory (or not), I should begin by discarding from the outset 
such an ontological view. This is a consequence of the critical approach adopted in 
this thesis. As a discourse, law does not have a meaning that can be discovered without 
considering the context and the subjects involved in its use. Just as the law cannot be 
in itself disempowering — even though it may have disempowering effects — it can-
not be in itself emancipatory — even though it may have emancipatory effects. In-
stead, asking if law can be emancipatory or not, is strictly related to how individuals 
and groups use it and to the contexts in which it is used, or the context against which 
they use it.192 This means that there are actions in which the law can be used in an 
emancipatory way if these actions allow for a greater degree of justice for oppressed 
groups that use the law in their struggles. 
There are two works that influenced the way in which I understand emancipation 
and its relation to law in this thesis, namely the work of Jacques Rancière and Boaven-
tura de Sousa Santos. As a way to reflect on the emancipatory potential of the legal 
category of the victim for victims of mass atrocities, in what follows, I will ponder on 
these two approaches, their differences and similarities. These reflections are not 
                                               
192 Santos also concludes that the question ‘Can the category of victim of international law be emancipatory’ is inadequate 
because law cannot be emancipatory or non-emancipatory, instead, it is the movements and organisations that resort to 
law to advance their struggles. Santos, supra note 16233 at 495.  
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meant as an in-depth study of the works of these two rather prolific authors.193 In-
stead, they are meant as a way to articulate how these two works have allowed me to 
elucidate my own position on the subject in light of the cases studied in this thesis.  
Both frameworks share similarities as they both attempt to reimagine the idea of 
emancipation.194 In Santos’ work, emancipation is framed in opposition to regulation, 
whereas in Rancière, emancipation is articulated through the opposite categories of 
police and politics. Modern regulation, in Santos, is the set of norms, institutions, and 
practices that guarantee the stability of expectations.195 This is a concept comparable 
to that of police in Rancière, which comprises an ‘implicit law’ regulating the distribu-
tion and legitimation of powers, places, and roles.196 What is crucial in Rancière’s po-
lice is the delimitation of inclusion/exclusion frontiers, which appears as an unavoid-
able consequence of the logic of police, according to which, bodies are put in their 
place and role according to their name.197 Instead, what is crucial in Santos’ modern 
regulation is the stability of expectations, which is achieved by establishing a ‘politically 
tolerable relation between present experiences (…) and expectations about the fu-
ture.’198 This is a more general concept that, in turn, includes three logics, namely the 
state, the market and the community. They are similar in that they do not refer to the 
law only but encompass also institutions and practices.199 This aspect was a crucial 
question for the way in which I analysed the cases in this thesis. The law is viewed as 
                                               
193 The main works in which these reflections are focused are: Santos, supra note 16233; Rancière, supra note 87. Other 
works have also been used to a lesser extent and will be referenced as usual. 
194 In particular, both of these accounts explicitly refer to their differences with Marxist accounts. In Ranciére, the con-
cept of emancipation is counterposed with the concept of emancipation in Marx. In Santos, he refers to the concept of 
globalisation against the concept of universality of in Marx. Rancière, supra note 87 at 103-104; Santos, supra note 162 at 
180- 181; more generally with regards to Rancière’s reconceptualisation, see: Gert Biesta, ‘A New Logic of emancipation: 
The Methodology of Jacques Rancière (2010) 60 Educational Theory 39. With regards to Santos’ reconceptualisation, see: 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘General Introduction: Reinventing Social Emancipation, Towards New Manifestos’ in: 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (ed) Reinventing Social Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos (Vol I, Verso, 2005).  
195 Santos, supra note 162 at 2. 
196 Mónica López Lerma and Julen Etxabe, ‘Introduction: Rancière and the possibility of law’ in in López Lerma, Mónica 
and Etxabe, Julen (eds), Rancière and Law (Taylor & Francis, 2017), 2. 
197 Rancière, supra note 87 at 27. 
198 Santos, supra note 162 at 2. 
199 What these institutions and practice do, so that they can be understood as part of the police or the regulation pillar, 
are different things, of course. Moreover, I should note here that Santos does pay a specific attention to the law, and 
asks if the law can be emancipatory because, for him, in modern law, emancipation has collapsed into regulation as it 
has been incorporated into regulation. Santos, supra note 162 at 21 et seq.  
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belonging to a larger category that also includes established practices, ideas, concepts, 
and even stereotypes — like the idea that victims of mass atrocities are without ex-
ception passive, defenceless and docile. These practices are reinforced by the repre-
sentations that legal operators produce, reproduce, and work with, and may remain 
unchanged if unchallenged.  
Furthermore, for Santos, emancipation is a set of oppositional aspirations and 
practices that aim to increase the discrepancy between experiences and expectations 
by calling into question the status quo by confronting and delegitimising the norms, 
institutions and practices that guarantee the stability of expectations.200 An emancipa-
tory struggle, in this account, is successful if it constitutes a new political relationship 
between experiences and expectations on a new and more demanding and inclusive 
level or, in other words, if it transforms itself into a new form of regulation.201 In turn, 
Rancière’s emancipation is the result of the political process in which excluded and 
invisible subjects are able to create a space in which their speech can be heard by police 
actors and show their exclusion. In this demonstration, they become political subjects 
who do not demand equality, but act as equals, and this is emancipatory.202 In this 
sense, in Rancière, emancipation comes from the process of political subjectification. 
This process materialises in a demonstration in which political actors use the same 
words that are part of the police order to put into question the established institutions 
and practices that belong to it. This demonstration may result in the reshaping those 
institutions and practices and the changing the status of those words.203 But the result 
of the demonstration does not affect its emancipatory character. Unlike in Santos, 
Rancière does not speak of the success of the emancipatory struggle, because the 
struggle itself is the emancipation. This is a core difference in emphasis between the 
                                               
200 Ibid, 2. 
201 Ibid. 
202 May, supra note 157 at 72-73; Rancière, supra note 87 at 35; and ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’ (1992) 
61 October 58, 58. 
203 Rancière, supra note 87 at 33. 
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two accounts that I will reflect upon later. Before that, allow me to consider specifi-
cally the way these authors understand the law, as my own research bases itself on the 
way victims use legal concepts.  
As stated earlier, both Santos and Rancière conceptualise the law as within a larger 
category which the former calls modern regulation, and the latter, police. Despite this 
similarity, they both assign a different place to the law in their studies. On the one 
hand, while Santos’ concept of modern regulation seems to remain wide enough so as 
to include different logics — some of which seem to escape Rancière’s analysis —204 
he, nevertheless, assigns a central role to the law — and to modern western science 
— in obscuring and discrediting the experiences of subalterns. Because of this, he 
explicitly reflects on the emancipatory possibilities of the law itself.205 On the other, 
this a question that remains absent from Rancière’s approach because his approach 
considers the political as essentially dynamic. Indeed, Rancière does not specifically 
reflect on the law.206 Nevertheless, I believe that they have more in common than what 
appears at a first glance. Santos’ work is certainly influenced by a postcolonial ap-
proach to law according to which modern law discredits, silences or negates the legal 
experiences of large bodies of the population.207 This way, Santos’ unequivocally 
acknowledges the hegemonic nature of modern law and his quest for emancipation in 
law relates to opening up a possibility for the law to articulate the interests of op-
pressed groups. Although Rancière, does not explicitly refer to the law’s hegemonic 
nature and how this affects oppressed groups in articulating their own demands he 
does suggest that emancipatory struggles are those that allow minorities to affirm their 
                                               
204 This division into three logics of the state, of the market and the community, is difficult to translate from Santos to 
Rancière, because Rancière’s concept of politics relies in the principle of equality, understood as the basic capacity of 
understanding that is assumed of those who obey. This could be connected with the principle of the state in Santos, 
understood as the ‘vertical political obligation between citizens and the state’ but also with the principle of community, 
which ‘entails the horizontal obligation that connects individuals according to criteria of non-state, and non-market 
belongingness.’  
205 Santos, supra note 162 at 439 et seq. 
206 Mónica López Lerma and Julen Etxabe, ‘Introduction: Rancière and the possibility of law’ in López Lerma, Mónica 
and Etxabe, Julen (eds), Rancière and Law (Taylor & Francis, 2017) 1, a notable exception is his piece on the subject of 
human rights: Ranciére, supra note 158162. 
207 Santos, supra note 162 at 494. 
 77 
identity. Indeed, when reflecting on the difference between Marxist emancipation and 
the ‘new emancipation’ that he advocates for, he states that in it, ‘a multiplicity of local 
rationalities and ethnic, sexual, religious, cultural, or aesthetic minorities, affirming 
their identity on the basis of the acknowledged contingency of all identity.’208 This 
notion of multiplicity may appear as somewhat contradictory to the idea of equality, 
central to Rancière’s notion of emancipation. But his notion of equality is rather min-
imalistic and refers only to an inherent quality present in community in which, for 
some to command and others to obey, the former must recognise that those who obey 
have a basic capacity to understand their commands.209 Thus, this basic equality has 
room for multiple identities to be reaffirmed through the process of political subjec-
tification. 
Thus, despite the fact that, unlike Santos, Rancière does not pay much attention 
to the law,210 and that, unlike Rancière, Santos does not view the emancipatory value 
of the process itself, both approaches are similar in that both focus on the struggles 
of oppressed groups. It is perhaps in this, that my own approach was most influenced 
by these two authors: The notion that these struggles are worth noticing and studying 
in order to ascertain their possibilities for social change. Indeed, for Santos, the strug-
gles of oppressed groups that use the law are central, and it is in the struggles them-
selves, and in their articulations of the law, where the possibility of emancipation 
should be located.211 Because of this, he proposes that the sociology of emergencies is 
the epistemology of a project that he calls subaltern cosmopolitan legality. Emergen-
cies, in this account, entail the interpretation of embryonic experiences of ‘initiatives, 
movements, and organisations that resist neoliberal globalization and offer alternatives 
                                               
208 Rancière, supra note 87 at 104; similarly, Santos discusses the differences with his conception of cosmopolitanism and 
Marx’s uni-versality of the oppressed, he contends that the main differences is that progressive cosmopolitan coalitions 
have no essentialist class base and can be mixed in composition, responding to different non-class lines such as ethnicity, 
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autonomies and identities. Santos, supra note 162 at 180. 
209 Rancière, supra note 87 at 16. 
210 López Lerma and Etxabe, supra note 20687 at 1. 
211 These struggles are what he considers as ’counter-hegemonic globalisation’ See: Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito supra 
note 42 at 1-23. 
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to it.’212 Rancière, in turn, puts emphasis on the process of subjectification: ‘the Rights 
of Man — says Rancière — are the rights of those who make something of that in-
scription.’213 The logic of this political subjectification or emancipation, is intimately 
connected with the question of exclusion, and thus, is certainly connected with the 
actions taken by oppressed groups. In his words, this logic is ‘a heterology, a logic of 
the other’ because it involves both the assertion of an identity and the denial of an 
identity given by the other in a demonstration that involves that other and that, in the 
end, entails an impossible identification.214 His works are thus full of examples of how 
this process can take place.  
Thus, both authors highlight the actions of excluded or oppressed groups or indi-
viduals and assert the possibility for them to challenge established concepts, practices 
and norms by using the very categories that belong to these established concepts, 
practices or norms, and transforming them. This is what I have done in this thesis: I 
have sought to reflect upon practices that can be described in those terms but with a 
specific emphasis on the use of specific legal categories.  
When reflecting about emancipation, I believe that these two accounts emphasise 
different aspects of emancipation, which can be seen as a process or as an end. Rancière’ 
work puts all the emphasis on the process: Emancipation is the process of political 
subjectification. In this process, the political subjects — that do not exist because they 
are excluded — use the words that are part of the police order, transform them and, 
in this demonstration, make themselves count.215 Santos, in turn, while still emphasis-
ing the importance of the process, also considers the end: The emancipatory struggle 
is successful to the extent that it destabilises the status quo and transforms itself into a 
new form of regulation. The difference is not substantive in that the two accounts are 
radically different, it is rather a question of emphases. Indeed, by the end of his ‘To-
wards a New Legal Common Sense’, Santos acknowledges that the question for the 
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213 Ranciére, supra note 158 at 303. 
214 Jacques Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’ (1992) 61 October 58, 62 
215 Rancière, supra note 87 at 27. 
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possibility of law being emancipatory or not, is a futile one, and that ‘law can be neither 
emancipatory nor non-emancipatory; emancipatory or non-emancipatory are the 
movements, the organizations (…) that resort to law to advance their struggles’. This 
difference in emphasis also reflects in the fact that, while admitting the contextual 
embedding of the concept of emancipation, Santos also distinguishes between thin 
and thick conceptions of social emancipation ‘according to the degree and quality of 
liberation or social inclusion they carry.’216 In turn, in the results of the process of 
subjectification in Rancière are not relevant to determine its emancipatory character 
because its character is in its motivation and its presupposition of equality.217 If the 
results are relevant in Ranciére, it is to the extent that the process of subjectification 
manages to demonstrate exclusion, but not in how this demonstration manages to 
change what he calls the police.  
I believe that the two emphases these approaches reveal are useful to reflect about 
the emancipatory possibilities of the category of victim as these two emphases allow 
to see the limitations and the possibilities of the law as a device for movements of 
victims of mass atrocities. Indeed, a central question in my own account of the actions 
of victims of mass atrocities in using legal categories is that the very process of sub-
jectification, or shall I say, the very process of emancipation, already puts into question 
the prevailing representations of the victim of mass atrocities in international law. In 
this contention, the idea of emancipation as a process, present in Rancière, is useful 
because it allows me to see and to highlight in my articles the value of the process 
itself. Highlighting the process through the articles of the dissertation did not neces-
sarily require discarding the possible outcomes of this process. Instead, it allowed me 
to value more subtle outcomes as important possibilities for victims of mass atrocities. 
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Here, cultural change can be underscored as an important outcome, which is admit-
tedly difficult to measure, but still relevant and should be acknowledged. Thus, in Co-
lombia, it is now a commonplace to say that victims are political actors.218  
In addition, to becoming an important political actor, victims have also become a 
crucial constituency. Although in the context of the ICC it has been stated that victims 
are an important constituency,219 it would be difficult to say that victims are important 
political actors. Indeed, outside of court cases, victims associations rarely have chances 
to participate,220 while in court cases, out of more than 12.000 victims participating in 
its proceedings, as stated in Article I, only three victims have actually appeared to 
present their views and concerns directly to the judges.221 Such a context, as demon-
strated in Article I, provides virtually no spaces for self-representation which is aggra-
vated by the many difficulties that the international process itself imposes upon vic-
tims, e.g. geographical distance, language barriers, cultural barriers, etc. This context 
makes the possibility of political subjectification virtually non-existent. As such, there 
is no space for emancipation, neither as a process, nor as an end. 
At the same time, if we consider emancipation as an end, the limits that the law 
represents for the actions of victims of mass atrocities in the different cases I studied 
become apparent. In this sense, in the study of the cases, I found that the law was 
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their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial’ ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx (26 June 2009). 
In the case of The Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba, other two victims were allowed to present evidence. See:  The Prosecutor v. 
Jean Pierre Bemba, ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’ ICC-01/05-01/08-3343 (21 March 2016), para. 24. 
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both enabling and limiting. As reflected in Article IV, there are two specific qualities 
of the international law regarding victims of mass atrocities, which allow victims to 
invoke those norms and infuse them with meanings. One is the coexistence of differ-
ent legal spaces governing the situation of victims of mass atrocities that operate sim-
ultaneously, namely international and domestic laws.222 This allows the victims to re-
sort to international law in order to challenge domestic receptions of it. The other is 
the indeterminate character of these norms. As Koskenniemi explains, this means 
‘there is nothing in the right itself that would decide them: the right receives meaning 
only when it is viewed by reference to some context or purpose.’ 223 However, it is 
important to precise, that the law does not determine its outcome does not mean that 
‘anything goes’, it means that the patterns of decision making are not explained by the 
norm itself but instead, that they are explained by other factors, such as institutional 
culture.224 Even if this last concept is often used in academia to demonstrate that the 
same norms allow for different outcomes in judicial decision-making, for the purposes 
of this thesis, the concept is useful in explaining how the law both enables and limits 
victims of mass atrocities in their use of categories of international law. It enables 
them in the sense that it allows them to present their ‘grievances as claims of universal 
entitlement, at the same level as claims made by other members of the community.’225 
At the same time, it limits the victims because their claims can have a response that 
complies with the international norm but does not address them. As such, emancipa-
tion as an end faces this important limitation that is inherent in the law as a device that 
utilises the written language allowing different conflicting interpretations to be 
grounded in the same norms.226  
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cipatory potential of counter-hegemonic struggles that resort to the law. In defining the concept of emancipation as an 
end, Santos’ seems to discard the possibility of the struggle as emancipatory. 
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Another set of limitations that I did not consider explicitly in the articles must be 
acknowledged here. Lack of enforcement of the law is a reality that, in a country such 
as Colombia, becomes an important element in analysing the limitations of its use by 
social movements. After all, law is a language of what it ought to be and not of what 
is. Indeed, the struggles of social movements using the language of the law are not 
new in Colombia. According to Tate, a first wave of human rights activists was formed 
by voluntary-based left-wing solidarity groups supporting guerrilla political prisoners 
that began to use the language of human rights in the eighties.227 Similarly, an im-
portant movement in the nineties was the student movement that successfully advo-
cated for a new constitution. The result of this movement was the Constitution of 
1991, one of the most progressive constitutions of the continent.228 Multiple move-
ments using the language of international law and the category of victim have fol-
lowed,229 including the ones studied in this thesis — formed exclusively by victims of 
mass atrocities. But despite the many occasions in which social movements used the 
language of the law and successfully achieved that it declared what the movements 
sought, violence has prevailed. This is, of course, not a question of indeterminacy, but 
of failure to comply with the law’s mandates. And this is another important limitation 
of the law as a language that is often resorted to by groups in the hope that it can 
subvert de facto powers responsible for the violence against political opposition, in the 
case of Movice, and against peasants, in the case of the Community.230  
Thus, if emancipation is considered as an end that can be measured in the realisa-
tion of the substantive aims of the movements in seeking more inclusiveness, equality, 
and recognition, the law places important limitations to its achievement. If emancipa-
tion is considered as a process, in which groups or subjects use the names that the law 
                                               
227 Winifred Tate, Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in Colombia (University of California 
Press, 2007), 72 et seq. 
228 This episode is beautifully narrated and analysed by Julieta Lemaitre Ripoll in: El Derecho como Conjuro: Fetichismo legal, 
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230 In this sense, Lemaitre explores the question of why, if law seems to impact so little in ending violence and poverty 
in Colombia, there seems to be so much faith in it by social movements. Ibid. 
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provides, appropriate them by infusing meanings into them that may challenge the 
prevailing understandings of those names, then the law is an important device for 
emancipation. In this view, the law provides a set of categories that grant legitimacy 
to victims’ struggles and allow them to re-signify their own identities. In this sense, 
considering the importance of the process, allows us to see that the categories of the 
law, as cultural categories, can be resisted by excluded or oppressed groups. This re-
sistance is not to be understood, as discussed earlier in this summarising text, as mere 
opposition but precisely as re-signification. Victims may resist the effects of the cate-
gory of victim by subverting the concepts, practices or norms that relate to the cate-
gory. Thus, to use categories of the sociology of social movements, it is not so much 
in the instrumental effects231 that one may find emancipation in the use of interna-
tional law categories, but rather in the expressive effects, that is, the possibility of 
cultural resistance. 
Although this is an aspect I did not explicitly discuss to in Articles II and III, both 
of them show that victims’ groups, in resorting to categories of international law, are 
genuinely seeking a legal response. For instance, in the case of Movice, one of the 
main aims of the groups’ first mobilisations was to achieve the inclusion of victims of 
State crimes in the legal framework that had, at that moment, excluded them. But this 
inclusion, in their view, ought to go with an official acknowledgment that, in Colom-
bia, there had been a sustained practice of repression of political leaders of opposition. 
However, though victims of state crimes were eventually included in the definition of 
victimhood in the Victims’ Law, two things remained: There was no official recogni-
tion of the existence of practice of persecuting political opposition by violent means; 
and violence itself continued to be a problem.  
In this sense, the expressive effects of the demands of the victims are more im-
portant than the legal ones. These expressive effects relate to, among other things, the 
                                               
231 Because I am focusing on the use of legal categories, I depart from Stammers’ concept of instrumental use and refer 
to it to describe the strictly legal response that victims of mass atrocities seek in wielding legal categories. Stammers, 
supra note 39. 
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very construction of the identity of the victim, but also, to those other meanings that 
victims infuse in the legal categories, which I studied in the articles that comprise this 
thesis. The expressive effects then, cannot be fully measured in legal terms and it is 
here that the victims may legitimate their alternative values, norms, lifestyles or vali-
date their perspectives and identities. Nevertheless, because the law is not interpreted 
in a vacuum, these expressive effects can also have an indirect effect on the way the 
law is dealt with by its operators. As such, the different uses that victims themselves 
do of the category of victim are a form of resistance. I believe that it is here that the 
possibility of emancipation through the use of a legal category may be found, and it is 
both emancipation as an end — the end being the cultural change — and as a process 
— through which oppressed groups may find articulation not for their demands, but 
also for their own identities and the stories that precede them. 
?  
 85 
6. References of the summarising text 
Abrams, Kathryn. ‘From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist perspectives on self-direc-
tion’ (1998-1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 805.  
 
Alcoff, Linda. ‘The Problem of Speaking for Others’ (1991-1992) 20 Cultural Critique 
5. 
 
Angie, Anthonie. ‘The Evolution of International Law: colonial and postcolonial re-
alities’ (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 739. 
 
Antkowiak, Thomas M. ‘An Emerging Mandate for International Courts: Victim-cen-
tered Remedies and Restorative Justice’ (2011) 47 Stanford Journal of International 
Law 279. 
 
Anyeko, Ketty et al. ‘”The Cooling of Hearts”: Community Truth-Telling in Northern 
Uganda’ (2012) 13 Human Rights Review 107. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, 1973). 
 
Badiou, Alain. Ethics: An essay on the understanding of evil (Verso, 2001). 
 
Bell, Christine. ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field” or 
“Non-Field”’ (2009) 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice 5  
 
Beitzel, Terry and Castle, Tammy. ‘Achieving Justice through the International Crim-
inal Court in Northern Uganda: Is Indigenous/Restorative Justice a Better Ap-
proach’ (2013) 23 International Criminal Justice Review 41. 
 
Bianchi, Andrea. International Law Theories (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
 
Biesta, Gert. ‘A New Logic of emancipation: The Methodology of Jacques Rancière 
(2010) 60 Educational Theory 39.  
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. ‘The Force of Law: Toward a sociology of the juridical field’ (1986-
1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805.  
 
Branch, Adam. Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford 
University Press, 2011).  
 
Bueno, Isabella and Diaz Rozas, Andrea. ‘Which Approach to Justice in Colombia 
under the Era of the ICC’ in Thordis Ingadottir, James Meernik, and Dawn Rothe. 
The Realities of International Criminal Justice (Brill Nijhoff, 2013). 
 
Burke-White, William W. ‘Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the 
Rome System of Justice’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 59. 
 86 
 
Cançado Trindade, Antônio Augusto. The Access of Individuals to International Justice (Ox-
ford University Press, 2011). 
 
Cançado Trindade, Antônio Augusto. International Law for Humankind. Towards a New 
Jus Gentium (2nd Edition, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013). 
 
Cassel, Douglas. 'The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by the 
Inter-American Court’ (2016) 7 Revista do Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Hu-
manos 91  
 
Cassese, Antonio. International Criminal Law (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
 
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dign-
idad (Imprenta Nacional, 2013). 
 
Cinep, El Reto de las Víctimas: El Reconocimiento de sus Derechos (Cinep, 2009). 
 
Claire, Brighton. ‘Avoiding Unwillingness: Addressing the Political Pitfalls Inherent in 
the Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court’ (2102) 12 Inter-
national Criminal Law Review 629.  
 
Clarke, Kamari. Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal 
Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
Cryer, Robert et al. An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
 
Dancy, Geoff and Montal Florencia. ‘Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why In-
ternational Criminal Court Investigations May Increase Domestic Human Rights 
Prosecutions’ (2017) 111 American Journal of International Law 689. 
 
de Greiff, Pablo. ‘Justice and Reparations’ in Pablo de Greiff (ed.) The Handbook of 
Reparations (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 
Delgado Barón, Mariana. ‘Las Víctimas como sujetos politicos en el proceso de justicia 
y paz en Colombia: discursos imperantes y disruptivos en torno a la reconciliación, 
la verdad, la justicia y la reparación’ (Doctoral Thesis, Flacso México, 2011). 
 
Diaz, Catalina. ‘Challenging Impunity from Below: The Contested Ownership of 
Transitional Justice in Colombia’ in McEvoy, Kieran and McGregor, Lorna (eds), 
Transitional Justice from Below (Oxford, Hart, 2008).  
 
 87 
Easterday, Jennifer. ‘Beyond the “shadow” of the ICC’ in De Vos, Christian; Sarah 
Kendall; and Carsten Stahn (eds.) Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of Interna-
tional Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
 
Eslava, Luis. ‘Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of International 
Law’ (2014) 2 London Review of International Law 3. 
 
Fassin, Didier. Humanitarian Reason. (University of California Press, 2012). 
 
Fisher, Kirsten. Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law (Routledge, 2012). 
 
Fletcher, Laurel. ‘Refracted Justice: The imagined victim and the International Crimi-
nal Court’ in De Vos, Christian; Sarah Kendall; and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested 
Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015). 
  
Frost, Tom. ‘Rancière, human rights, politics of process’ in López Lerma, Mónica and 
Etxabe, Julen (eds), Rancière and Law (Taylor & Francis, 2017). 
 
García Arboleda, Juan Felipe. El Lugar de las Víctimas en Colombia (Pontificia Univer-
sidad Javeriana, 2013). 
 
GMH, La Masacre de El Salado: Esa guerra no era nuestra (GMH, 2009). 
 
Gómez Sánchez, Gabriel. Justicia Transicional en Disputa (Universidad de Antioquia, 
2014). 
 
Goodale, Mark and Merry, Sally Engle (eds). The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law 
between the Global and the Local (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
 
Goodale, Mark (ed). Human Rights: An Anthropological Reader (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). 
 
Hall, Stuart. ‘Introduction: Who Needs Identity?’ In: Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay 
(eds) Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage, 1996). 
 
Haslam, Emily. ‘Subjects and Objects: International Criminal Law and the Institution-
alization of Civil Society’ (2011) 5 International Journal of Transitional Justice 221. 
 
Hellman, Matias. ‘Challenges and limitations of outreach. From the ICTY to the ICC’ 
in De Vos, Christian; Sarah Kendall; and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The 
Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015). 
 
Hirvonen, Ari. ‘Fight for your rights: Refugees, resistance, and disagreement’, in López 
Lerma, Mónica and Etxabe, Julen (eds), Rancière and Law (Taylor & Francis, 2017). 
 
Jaramillo, Pablo. ‘Deuda, desesperación y reparaciones inconclusas en la Guajira, Co-
lombia’ (2012) 14 Antípoda 41. 
 88 
 
Katan, Amelia and Komakech, Daniel. ‘Peace and Prosecution: An Analysis of Per-
ceptions towards the International Criminal Court Intervention’s in Northern 
Uganda’ (2017) 10 African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies 1.  
 
Kendall, Sara and Nouwen, Sarah. ‘Representational Practices at the International 
Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood’ (2014) 76 
Law and Contemporary Problems 235. 
 
Kennedy, David. ‘International Human Rights Movement: Part of the problem?’ 
(2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 101. 
 
Koskenniemi, Martti. ‘Letter to the Editors of the Symposium’ (1999) 93 The Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 351. 
 
Koskkeniemi, Martti. ‘What is International Law For?’ in Evans, Malcom D. (ed) In-
ternational Law (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
Koskenniemi, Martti. The Politics of International Law: Cursos Euromediterráneos Bancaja de 
Derecho Internacional (Tirant lo Blanch, 2009).  
 
Lemaitre Ripoll, Julieta. El Derecho como Conjuro: Fetichismo legal, violencia y movimientos 
sociales (Siglo del Hombre Editores and Universidad de los Andes, 2009). 
 
Lindroos-Hovinheimo, Susanna. ‘Rancière and the legal subject Coming to terms with 
non-existence,’ in López Lerma, Mónica and Etxabe, Julen (eds), Rancière and Law 
(Taylor & Francis, 2017). 
 
López Lerma, Mónica and Etxabe, Julen. ‘Introduction: Rancière and the possibility 
of law’ in López Lerma, Mónica and Etxabe, Julen (eds), Rancière and Law (Taylor 
& Francis, 2017). 
 
Madlingozi, Tsepo. ‘On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of Vic-
tims’ (2010) 2 Journal of Human Rights Practice 208. 
 
Marks, Susan and Clapham, Andrew. International Human Rights Lexicon (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005). 
 
May, Todd. ‘Wrong, Disagreement, Subjectification’ in Jean-Philippe Deranty (ed), 
Jacques Rancière: Key Concepts (2010).  
 
McCarthy, Conor. Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012). 
 
McEvoy, Kieran and McGregor, Lorna. ‘Transitional Justice From Below: an agenda 
for research, policy and praxis’ in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds) Tran-
sitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart, 2008). 
 89 
 
McEvoy, Kieran and McConnachie, Kirsten. ‘Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, 
Agency and Blame’ (2013) 22 Social & Legal Studies 489. 
 
McGonigle, Brianne. Procedural Justice?: Victim participation in international criminal proceed-
ings (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2011). 
 
McLoughlin, Daniel. ‘Post-Marxism and the Politics of Human Rights: Lefort, Badiou, 
Agamben, Rancière’ (2016) 27 Law and Critique 303. 
 
Meister, Robert. ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood’ (2002) 16 Ethics & 
International Affairs 91. 
 
Mégret, Frédéric. ‘In whose name? The ICC and the search for constituency’ in De 
Vos, Christian; Sarah Kendall; and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics 
and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015). 
 
Mégret, Frédéric. ‘The anxieties of International Criminal Justice’ (2016) 29 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 197. 
 
Meredith, Valerie M. ‘Victim Identity and Respect for Human Dignity: A terminolog-
ical analysis’ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 259. 
 
Merry, Sally Engle. ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the 
Middle’ (2006) 108 American Anthropologist 38. 
 
Minkkinen, Panu. ‘Critical legal “method” as attitude’ in Watkins, Dawn and Burton 
Mandy (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013). 
 
Moffett, Luke. Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court (Routledge, New 
York, 2014)  
 
Moffett, Luke. ‘Complementarity's Monopoly on Justice in Uganda: The International 
Criminal Court, Victims and Thomas Kwoyelo’ (2016) 16 International Criminal 
Law Review 503. 
 
Mora-Gámez, Fredy. ‘Reconocimiento de víctimas del conflicto armado en Colombia: 
Sobre tecnologías de representación y configuraciones de Estado’ (2016) 82 Uni-
versitas Humaística 75. 
 
Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap Press, 2012). 
 
Mutua, Makau. ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ 
(2001) 42 Harvard International Law Journal 201. 
 
 90 
Newton, Michael A. ‘A synthesis of community-based justice and complementarity’ 
in De Vos, Christian; Sarah Kendall; and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The 
Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015). 
 
Nouwen, Sarah. Complementarity in the Line of Fire (Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
 
OHCHR. Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
HR/PUB/13/5 (2014). 
 
Ottendoerfer, Eva. ‘Translating Victims' "Right to Reparations" Into Practice: A 
Framework for Assessing the Implementation of Reparations Programs From a 
Bottom-Up Perspective’ (2018) 40 Human Rights Quarterly 905. 
 
Otto, Dianne. ‘Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Commu-
nity and the Incommensurability of Difference’ (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 337. 
 
Pabón Ayala, Nathalie et al. Memoria y Víctimas en las Fuerzas Militares (Editorial Uni-
versidad del Rosario, 2018). 
 
Pentelovitch, Norman Henry. Seeing justice done: the importance of prioritizing out-
reach efforts at international criminal tribunals (2008) 39 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 445.  
 
Petman, Jarna. ‘Human Rights and Violence: The hope and fear of the liberal world’ 
(DoctoralThesis, University of Helsinki, 2012).  
 
Phillips, Nelson and Hardy, Cynthia. Discourse Analysis (SAGE, 2002). 
 
Quintana, Laura. ‘Derechos, desacuerdo y subjetivación política’ in A. Fjeld, L. Quin-
tana and Ë. Tassin (eds.), Movimientos Sociales y Subjetivaciones Políticas (2016). 
 
Ragin, Charles. ‘What is a Case?’ in Ragin, Charles and Becker, Howard (eds.), What is 
a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry (1992).  
 
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. International Law From Below: Development, Social Movements and 
Third World Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 
Rancière, Jacques. ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’ (1992) 61 October 58. 
 
Rancière, Jacques. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (University of Minnesota Press, 
1999). 
 
Ranciére, Jacques. ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’ (2004) 103 South Atlan-
tic Quarterly 297. 
 
 91 
Rettberg, Angelika. ‘Victims of the Colombian Armed Conflict: The Birth of a Politi-
cal Actor.’ Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317270. 
 
Reyes Posada, Alejandro. Guerreros y Campesinos. Despojo y restitución de tierras en Colombia 
(2nd Edition, Editorial Planeta, 2009). 
 
Roach, Steven C. ‘Multilayered Justice in Northern Uganda: ICC Intervention and 
Local Procedures of Accountability’ Thordis Ingadottir et al (eds) The Realities of 
International Criminal Justice (Brill, Nijhoff, 2013). 
 
Robinson, Darryl. ‘Serving the Interest of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and 
the International Criminal Court’in Joanna Harrington et al (eds) Bringing Power to 
Justice? : The Prospects of the International Criminal Court (McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2006). 
 
Rojas Bolaños, Omar Eduardo and Benavides Silva, Fabián Leonardo. Ejecuciones Ex-
trajudiciales en Colombia 2002-2010 (Ediciones USTA, 2017). 
 
Rudy, Daniella and Hirst, Megan. ‘Victims Appearing in Person before a Chamber’ in 
Tibori-Szabó, Kinga and Hirst, Megan (eds.), Victim Participation in International 
Criminal Justice (2017). 
 
Sánchez León, Nelson Camilo. Tierra en transición: justicia transicional, restitución de tierras 
y política agraria en Colombia (DeJusticia, 2017). 
 
Sandoval Rojas, Nathalia. Movilizarse ante la Corte (Uniandes, 2015). 
 
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern 
Conception of Law’ (1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society 279. 
 
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. Toward a New Legal Common Sense (2nd Edition, 2002, 
Cambridge University Press).  
 
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. ‘General Introduction: Reinventing Social Emancipa-
tion, Towards New Manifestos’ in Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (ed) Reinventing So-
cial Emancipation: Toward New Manifestos (Vol I, Verso, 2005).  
 
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa and Rodríguez-Garavito, César (eds). Law and Globaliza-
tion From Below: Towards a cosmopolitan legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
Schwöbel-Patel, Christine. ‘Spectacle in International Criminal Law: The fundraising 
image of victimhood’ (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 247. 
 
Singer, Joseph William. ‘The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’ (1984) 
94 The Yale Law Journal 1. 
 
 92 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Williams, Patrick and 
Chrisman, Laura (eds) Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, a Reader (Columbia 
University Press, 1993) 
 
Stammers, Neil. Human Rights and Social Movements (Pluto Press, 2009). 
 
Steiner, Henry; Alston, Philip; and Goodman, Ryan. International Human Rights in Con-
text (3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2007).  
 
Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics (3rd Edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 
Tate, Winifred. Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in 
Colombia (California Series in Public Anthropology, 2007). 
 
Teitel, Ruti. Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
Teitel, Ruti. ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
69. 
 
Terdiman, Richard. Translator’s Introduction to ‘The Force of Law: Toward a sociol-
ogy of the juridical field’ (1986-1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805.  
 
Tuori, Kaarlo. ‘Law, Power and Critique’ in Tuori, Kaarlo et seq (eds), Law and Power: 
Critical and Socio-Legal Essays (Deborah Charles Publications, 1997). 
 
Turner, Catherine. Violence, Law and the Impossibility of Transitional Justice (Routledge, 
2017).  
 
Uprimny, Rodrigo and Saffón, Maria Paula. ‘Justicia Transicional y Justicia Restaura-
tiva: Tensiones y Complementariedades’ en Angelika Rettberg (ed), Entre el Perdón y 
el Paredón: Preguntas y dilemas de la justicia transicional (Ediciones Uniandes, 2005). 
 
Urueña, René. No Citizens Here: Global Subjects and Participation in International Law (Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 
 
Van Dijk, Teun A. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ in Tannen, Deborah et al (eds) The 
Handbook of Discourse Analysis (2nd Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 2015).  
 
Various authors, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 
Vol. 103, 2009 (Published by: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Vera Lugo, Juan Pablo. ‘Transitional Justice, Memory, and the Emergence of Legal 
Subjectivities in Colombia’ in Brunnegger, Sandra and Faulk, Karen (eds) A Sense of 
Justice: Legal Knowledge and Lived Experience in Latin America (Stanford University 
Press, 2016). 
 93 
 
Waldorf, Lars. ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic 
Wrongs’ (2012) 21 Social & Legal Studies 171  
 
Wilson, Richard. ‘Representing Human Rights Violations: Social Contexts and Sub-
jectivities’ in Goodale, Mark (ed.), Human Rights: An Anthropological Reader (2009).  
